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HE  ETHICAL  IDEAL 
OF  RENUNCIATION 

cA  thesis 


BY 

CORDIE  JACOB  CULP,  M.  A. 


THE  ETHICAL  IDEAL  OF  RENUNCIATION 


A  THESIS 

BY 

CORDIE  JACOB  CULP,  M.  A, 


Accepted  by  the  Graduate  School  of  New  York  University, 

in  Partial  Fulfillment  of  the  Requirements  for  the 

Degree  of  Doctor  of  Philosophy. 

I914 


To 
F.  B.  C. 

Companion,  Adviser,  Helper 

This  Monograph  is 
Affectionately  Dedicated 


CONTENTS 

Pages 
I.  INTRODUCTION  :-The  Nature  of  the  Ethical 

Problem 7-8 

1.  The  Older  View:    Life   as  enjoyment,  Epicu- 

rean. Life  as  obligation,  Stoic.  Consequent 
dualism.  Hedonism  and  Rationalism.  The 
search  after  a  reconciling  principle 7 

2.  The  Newer  View:    Life  as  realization,  Aesthet- 

ics. Life  as  renunciation.  Religion.  Eudae- 
monism  and  Rigorism.  Life  in  its  unity.  The 
aim  of  this  thesis 7-8 

XL  RENUNCIATION    IN    ITS    HISTORICAL 

Development   8-46 

A.  Orientalism. 

1.  Taoism:  The  speculative  principle  of  the 
Tao,  nihilistic.  The  ethical  principle  of  the 
Teh,  doing  nothing.  Non-resentment  and 
non-resistance 8-1 1 

2.  Yogaism:  Compared  with  Taoism.  The 
Universal  Self.  The  practical  principle  of 
worklessness.     The  basis  for  non-resentment 

and  non-resistance 1 1-14 

3.  Buddhism:  Compared  with  Taoism  and 
Yogaism.  The  Buddhistic  motive.  Annihila- 
tion of  desire.     Nirvanism 14-16 

4.  Christianity:  Compared  with  other  forms  of 
orientalism.  Teaching  of  Jesus,  self-denial 
and  self-hatred.  Teaching  of  St.  Paul,  inva- 
lidity of  good  works.  Transition  of  Christi- 
anity to  the  Occident.     Conflict  with  Pagan- 

(3) 


305620 


Contents 

Pages 
ism.      Augustine.       *'Via  negativa"   Renais- 
sance and  the  Reformation.    The  rise  of  Ra- 
tionalism        16-23 

B.  Modernity: — The     Rationalistic     Withdrawal 

from  Nature. 

1.  The  problem  of  Descartes:  The  dualism  of 
mind  and  matter.  Interaction  of  body  and 
mind 23-24 

2.  Occasionalism:  Geulincx:  Virtue  ''Amor  Dei 
ac  Rationis."  "Inspectio  sui"  ''Despectio  sui'' 
"Contemptio  sui."  Malebranche.  Seeing  in 
God.  Loving  God.  Spinoza  and  Occasional- 
ism, ''Amor  intellectualis  Dei"  Pascal,  con- 
tempt of  reason.    Exaltation  of  will 24-31 

C.  Revival  of  Renunciation  in  the  igth  Century. 

1.  Schopenhauer:  The  World  as  Will  and  Idea, 
The  Will-to-live.  Life  as  evil.  Denial  of 
The    Will-to-live.       Pessimism    of    Bahnsen. 

The  contention  of  Frauenstadt 32-37 

2.  Hartmann:  Compared  with  Schopenhauer. 
Will  unconscious  but  intelligent.  Affirmation 
of  the  Will-to-live.     Final  annihilation  of  the 

will .  •  • 37-38 

3.  Wagner:  The  superman.  Nirvanism  of 
Wotan  in  "The  Ring"  The  "Black  flag"  of 
Tristan  and  Isolde.    Parsifal 3^-40 

4.  Ibsen:  Brand,  "All  or  none."  Peer  Gynt, 
"Barrel  of  self."  Emperor  and  Galilean, 
"Thou  hast  conquered."  Rosmersholm,  "The 
Rosmer  view  of  life" 40-41 

5.  Russian  Submission  and  Sympathism:  Tol- 
stoi, doctrine  of  non-resistance.  Dostoieffsky, 
egoism  and  repentance 41-43 

6.  Opposition  to  renunciation.  Sudermann,  in- 
dividualism and  immoralism.    Repudiation  of 


Contents  5 

Pages 

moral  standards.  Nietzsche,  WUl-to-powcr. 
Superman.  Ascetic  ideals.  Contempt  for 
Christianity    43-46 

III.  RENUNCIATION     AS     AN     ETHICAL 

IDEAL 46-55 

J.  Negative. 

1.  Life  can  not  contain  nor  content  man:  Per- 
sistency and  universality  of  renunciatory 
ideals.  The  lack  in  human  life.  Nature  and 
spirit 46-50 

2.  The  spiritual  nature  of  man:  No  place  in 
nature.      The  historical  negation  of  nature. 

The  problem  of  self-hood 49-50 

B.  Positive. 

1.  Renunciation  as  the  path  to  spiritual  life.  The 
more  in  human  life.  Man's  critical  attitude 
toward  the  world.    The  affirmation  of  the  self  50-51 

2.  Self-realization  through  renunciation:  The 
self  and  nature.  Subdual  of  the  world  of 
sense.  Renunciation  as  conceived  by  Russian 
thought  and  Christianity.  Metaphysical  and 
moral  grounds.  A  valid  ideal  for  complete- 
ness of  life.    The  home  and  the  work  of  the 

self    51-55 

BIBLIOGRAPHY    56-57 


I.    INTRODUCTION. 

The  problem  of  renunciation  arises  in  connection  with  the 
newer  and  more  profound  conception  of  the  moral  life,  as 
it  has  been  developed  by  modern  writers.  According  to  the 
traditional  view,  the  ethical  decision  and  moral  choice  had 
to  do  with  one  or  other  of  the  peculiar  functions  of  con- 
sciousness, as  feeling  or  intellect,  sensibility  or  reason.  Thus 
arose  the  dualism  which  occasioned  the  sharp  conflict  be- 
tween Epicureanism  and  Stoicism,  the  ideal  of  the  former 
being  the  enjoyment  of  life,  while  the  latter  made  life  a  mat- 
ter of  obligation.  This  dualism  persisted  in  modern  think- 
ing in  the  form  of  Hedonism  on  the  one  hand  and  Rational- 
ism on  the  other  with  a  constant  conflict  which  served  in 
time  to  reveal  the  inadequacy  of  either  conception  to  meet 
the  ethical  demands  of  humanity.  Hedonism  possessed  ma- 
terial and  content  in  sensibility  but  lacked  form  and  a  regu- 
lating principle,  while  Rationalism  had  the  form  and  regu- 
lating principle  but  lacked  material  and  content.  Consequent- 
ly there  was  a  search  for  a  reconciling  principle  which  would 
recognize  the  rights  of  both  Hedonism  and  Rationalism. 
This  search  resulted  in  the  conclusion  that  life  must  be  con- 
ceived as  an  unit  which  took  the  form  of  Eudaemonism, 
where  self-realization  through  the  aesthetical  impulse  was 
the  ideal,  or  Rigorism,  where  the  religious  influence  was  para- 
mount. Both  views  apprehended  life  as  a  whole  but  where 
Eudaemonism  counselled  man  to  accept  life.  Rigorism  de- 
manded that  he  reject  it.  Therefore,  the  distinction  which 
now  obtains  in  the  moral  field,  instead  of  forcing  the  ethical 
subject  to  choose  between  separate  functions  of  consciousness, 
man  is  called  upon  to  regard  his  life  as  an  unity  and  upon 
this  basis  to  either  assert  his  life  as  a  whole  or  deny  it.  Thus 
arises  our  problem  of  renunciation.  For  its  proper  consid- 
eration as  an  ethical  ideal,  its  place  in  human  thought  and 

(7) 


>•   _•_•** 


8  The  Ethical  Ideal  of  Renunciation 

the  forms  in  which  it  appears,  it  is  necessary  that  this  thesis 
be  historical  and  expository  with  some  critical  estimate  of 
renunciation  as  a  problem  in  human  life. 

II.     RENUNCIATION  IN  ITS  HISTORICAL 
DEVELOPMENT. 

Following  the  superior  conception  of  ethics  as  something 
concerned  with  life  as  a  whole,  there  arises  the  necessity  of 
exploring  the  whole  field  of  historical  ethical  inquiry,  so 
that  instead  of  beginning  with  Socrates  or  Hobbes,  we  must 
consider  the  earlier  forms  of  morality  as  these  are  found 
in  the  oriental  world.  For  this  reason  it  is  expedient  that 
we  examine  the  subject  of  renunciation  as  it  appears  in 
Taoism,  Yogaism,  Buddhism  and  Christianity  as  well  as  the 
various  forms  of  occidental  thinking.  With  Taoism  and 
Yogaism,  the  problem  concerns  itself  with  activity.  Each 
system  agreeing  that  all  action  must  be  repudiated,  the  one 
ending  in  nihilism  and  the  other  in  worklessness.  Buddhism 
and  Christianity  are  ethical  where  Taoism  and  Yogaism  are 
more  metaphysical.  These  have  their  seat  in  the  spiritual 
life  of  man  and  when  they  counsel  their  disciples  to  re- 
nounce the  world,  the  result  of  Buddhism  is  a  pessimism  of 
a  weak  and  negative  sort,  while  with  Christianity,  it  is  a 
pessimism  of  a  stronger  and  more  positive  character.  In 
all  four  of  these  systems,  renunciation  is  paramount. 

A.  Orientalism. 

I.  Both  in  point  of  time  and  development,  Taoism  of- 
fers a  fitting  field  for  the  beginning  of  our  historical  inquiry 
as  to  the  subject  of  renunciation.  This  early  form  of  Mon- 
golian thought  is  naive,  naturistic  and  individualistic.  It 
finds  its  most  perfect  expression  in  the  writings  of  Laotzc, 
known  as  the  Tao-Teh-King,  a  paradoxical  and  unsyste- 
matical  treatise  on  metaphysics  and  ethics.  The  Tao  is  the 
speculative  principle  and  the  Teh  the  practical  principle, 
with  no  clear  distinctions  between  them.  The  Tao  is  an- 
alogous to  the  Greek  principle  of  the  Aoyos  or  the  natura 


Renunciation  in  Its  Historical  Development  9 

naturans  of  Bruno  and  Spinoza.  Laotze  speaks  of  it  thus: 
"There  is  something  undefined  and  complete,  coming  into 
existence  before  Heaven  and  Earth.  How  still  it  was  and 
formless,  standing  alone,  and  undergoing  no  change,  reach- 
ing everywhere  and  in  no  danger  (of  being  exhausted)  !  It 
may  be  regarded  as  the  Mother  of  all  things.  I  do  not 
know  its  name,  and  I  give  it  the  designation  of  the  Tao."^ 
He  further  declares  that  "It  might  appear  to  have  been  be- 
fore God."^  A  further  examination  of  the  Taoistic  prin- 
ciple indicates  that  its  real  nature  is  nihilistic.  In  fact  Laotze 
anticipates  the  Hegelian  notion  that  pure  being  is  equivalent 
to  nothing.  He  says  "The  Tao  is  like  the  emptiness  of  a 
vessel."^  It  is  also  likened  to  the  space  for  the  axle  in  the 
hub  of  a  wheel  or  to  the  openings  for  windows  and  doors  in 
the  walls  of  a  house.*  The  Tao  is  nihilistic  in  its  operations. 
It  is  impalpable.  It  eludes  the  senses.  It  is  the  equable,  the 
inaudible  and  the  subtle.^  In  its  method  of  procedure,  the 
Tao  moves  by  contraries: 

"The  movement  of  the  Tao 
By  contraries  proceeds; 
And  weakness  marks  the  course 
Of  Tao's  mighty  deeds."* 

Its  existence  is  non-existence,  its  fullness  is  emptiness,  its 
l)rightness  is  darkness  and  its  progress  is  retrogression.*^  Such 
paradoxical  illustrations  as  these  serve  to  show  the  nihilism 
which  lies  at  the  heart  of  the  system,  the  most  definite  as- 
sertion of  which  occurs  in  the  37th  chapter  of  the  first  part 
of  the  Tao-Teh-King  where  Laotze  declares:  "The  Tao  in 
its  regular  course  does  nothing  and  so  there  is  nothing  which 
it  can  not  do." 

Turning  to  the  Teh,  the  ethical  principle  of  the  system, 
we  are  met  with  the  assertion  that  "Man  takes  his  law  from 
the  earth;  the  earth  takes  its  law  from  heaven;  heaven  takes 


I. 

Tao-Teh-King,  tr.  Legge,  pt.  I,  ch.  25. 

2. 

lb.,  ch.  4. 

3- 

lb.,  ch.  4,  sec.  I. 

4- 

lb.,  ch.   II. 

5- 

lb.,  ch.   14. 

6. 

lb.,  pt.  II,  ch.  40. 

7- 

lb.,  pt.  I,  ch.  21. 

lO  The  Ethical  Ideal  of  Renunciation 

its  law  from  the  Tao."^  Therefore,  the  law  of  man's  life 
is  a  form  of  quiescence  which  has  its  root  in  the  metaphysical 
nihilism  of  Taoism.  Many  and  various  are  the  ways  in 
which  this  quiescent  state  is  portrayed.  The  man  of  Tao 
is  declared  to  be  ^'Vacant  like  a  valley  and  dull  like  muddy 
water."^  Water  is  a  favorite  emblem  of  Laotze  for  both 
the  Teh  and  the  Tao :  '*There  is  nothing  in  the  world  more 
soft  and  weak  than  water  and  yet  for  attacking  things  that 
are  firm  and  strong  there  is  nothing  that  can  take  precedence 
of  it; — for  there  is  nothing  (so  effectual)  for  which  it  can 
be  changed."^  It  is  the  yielding  character,  stillness  and  ap- 
parent weakness  of  water  which  make  it  such  an  attractive 
figure  for  the  way  of  human  conduct.^  The  ideal  state  for 
humanity  is  one  of  listlessness  and  stillness  where  all  desire 
ceases  to  exist.  Man  must  be  ''Like  an  infant  which  has  not 
smiled."^  To  attain  to  this  ideal  of  "doing  nothing"  is 
man's  most  sublime  achievement  and  greatest  enjoyment. 
Kwang-sze  says :  "I  consider  doing  nothing  to  be  the  greatest 
enjoyment."^  Laotze  in  portraying  this  ideal  is  careful  to 
point  out  the  road  for  its  attainment  which  is  the  renuncia- 
tion of  all  forms  of  activity,  whether  of  the  inner  or  the 
outer  life  of  man.  He  must  constantly  diminish  his  doing^ 
until  ''He  arrives  at  doing  nothing."^  All  desire  must  be 
stilled  until  it  absolutely  ceases.^  All  human  wisdom,  be- 
nevolence, righteousness  and  learning  must  be  renounced.'* 
By  following  such  a  path  man  will  discover  the  principle 
of  all  successful  government,  solve  all  social  problems  and 
free  society  from  all  disorder.^^    Thus  the  real  Utopia,  ac- 


I. 

Tao-Teh-King,  pt.  I,  ch.  25. 

2. 

lb.,  15. 

3. 

lb.,  pt.  II,  ch.  78. 

4. 

lb.,  pt.  I,  ch.  8;  pt.  II,  ch.  66  et  al. 

5. 

lb.,  pt.  I,  ch.  20. 

6. 

Writings  of  Kwang-sze,  tr.  Legge,  Bk.  18. 

7. 

Tao-Teh-ing,  pt.  II,  ch.  48. 

8. 

lb.,  ch.  I. 

9- 

lb.,  ch.  19. 

10. 

lb.,  pt.  I,  ch.  3 ;  pt.  II,  ch.  57. 

Renunciation  in  Its  Historical  Development         1 1 

cording  to  the  Taoistic  system  is  the  *'Land  of  the  great 
vacuity"  where  after  the  manner  of  Heaven  and  Earth, 
man  sinks  into  the  state  where 

"With  no  desire,  at  rest  and  still 
All  things  go  right  as  of  their  will."* 

In  Taoism,  renunciation  also  appears  in  the  forms  of 
non-resentment  and  non-resistance.  It  is  said  of  the  Taoistic 
sage:  "Because  he  does  not  strive,  no  one  finds  it  possible  to 
strive  with  him."^  Speaking  of  war  the  sage  declares:  "I 
do  not  dare  to  advance  an  inch;  I  prefer  to  retire  a  foot."^ 
Non-resentment  is  counselled  even  more  definitely.  The  sage 
makes  the  mind  of  the  people  his  mind  and  declares:  "To 
those  who  are  good  to  me,  I  am  good;  and  to  those  who  are 
not  good  to  me,  I  am  also  good."*  The  teachings  of  Jesus 
and  Tolstoi  are  anticipated  in  the  unexpected  declaration: 
"It  is  the  way  of  the  Tao  to  recompense  injury  with  kind- 
ness."^ The  foundation  of  non-resistance  and  non-resent- 
ment lies  also  in  the  nihilism  of  the  system  of  Taoism  with  its 
symbols  of  emptiness  and  non-action.  If  nothing  exists  ana 
nothing  needs  to  be  done,  naturally  all  reaction  on  the  part 
of  humanity  is  not  only  out  of  place  but  entirely  useless. 
Renunciation,  as  the  life  ideal  of  Taoism,  can  not  permit 
activity  even  under  the  forms  of  non-resistance  and  non- 
resentment.  To  the  thorough-going  Taoist,  man's  ordinary 
life  is  valueless  and  to  be  negated  as  completely  as  the 
nihilism  of  the  system  negates  the  world. 

2.  1  he  doctrine  of  Yogaism  while  agreeing  with  Taoism  in 
counselling  non-activity  as  an  ideal  for  human  life,  differs 
from  that  system  in  being  more  intellectual  but  scarcely  more 
systematic.  Where  Taoism  investigated  nature  and  found 
it  empty,  the  Yoga  affirms  the  absolute  self  in  opposition 
to  the  external  world,  therefore,  the  Yoga  has  a  more  sub- 


I. 

Tao-Teh-King,  pt.  I,  ch.  37. 

2. 

Tao-Teh-King,  pt.  II,  ch.  66. 

3- 

lb.,  ch.  69. 

4- 

lb.,  ch.  49. 

5- 

Tb.,  ch.  63 

12  The  Ethical  Ideal  of  Renunciation 

stantlal  metaphysics  and  while  repudiating  action,  its  form 
of  renunciation  is  of  a  higher  and  more  logical  nature  than 
that  of  Mongolian  thought.  The  speculative  basis  for  the 
Yoga  doctrine  is  the  Brahman  or  universal  self  of  the  Ve- 
danta  philosophy,  the  Yoga  being  the  practical  aspect  which 
finds  its  clearest  expression  in  the  Bhagavadgita.  Where 
the  Vedanta  counsels  the  ideal  of  contemplation,  the  Yoga 
of  renunciation  proceeds  to  realize  the  ideal,  hence  its  con- 
cern has  to  do  with  the  emancipation  of  the  individual  self 
from  the  delusion  of  the  immediate  and  external  and  the 
junction  with  the  Absolute  Self  which  is  declared  to  be  the 
"Brahmic  Bliss/'^  The  Yoga  is  closely  related  to  the  Sankya 
doctrine  of  knowledge  as  the  path  to  the  "Brahma-nirvana." 
In  fact  they  are  declared  to  be  one  and  the  same;  "He  sees 
truly"  says  Deity,  "who  sees  Sankya  and  Yoga  as  one."^  Ac- 
cording to  the  Sankya,  the  path  of  knowledge  is  secured  by 
renunciation  in  the  form  of  a  thorough-going  asceticism.  (The 
Hatha  Yoga),  and  by  the  mortification  of  all  desires  and  the 
absolute  abandonment  of  all  action,  (The  Raja  Yoga),  until 
the  mind  attains  to  a  state  of  undisturbed  meditation.^  The 
renunciation  required  by  the  Sankya  doctrine,  so  far  as  it 
pertains  to  activity,  is  as  nihilistic  as  that  of  Taoism.  How- 
ever, in  the  Yoga,  renunciation  has  to  do  with  the  purpose 
and  the  motive  of  activity,  rather  than  with  activity  itself, 
thus  yielding  a  kind  of  worklessness,  in  which  man  repudiates 
all  desire,  ends  and  fruits  of  action.*  The  Yoga  recognizes 
a  practical  difficulty  which  seems  to  be  entirely  ignored  by 
Taoism  and  the  Sankya  and  declares  that  "A  man  does  not 
attain  freedom  from  action  merely  by  not  engaging  in  ac- 
tion, for  nobody  ever  remains  even  for  an  instant  without 
performing  some  action."  Therefore,  the  Yoga  counsels: 
"Action  is  better  than  inaction."^  In  this  the  Sankya  doc- 
trine is  not  so  much  repudiated  by  the  Bhagavadgita  as  it  is 


I. 

Bhagavadgita,  tr.,  Telang,  ch.  2. 

2. 

lb.,  ch.  5. 

3. 

lb.,  ch.  2. 

4- 

lb.  ch.  3. 

5. 

Tb,  ch   3 

Renunciation  in  Its  Historical  Development         13 

considered  inferior.  Deity  says:  "There  is  a  two-fold  path, 
that  of  the  Sankyas  by  devotion  in  the  shape  of  true  knowl- 
edge; and  that  of  the  Yogins  by  devotion  in  the  shape  of  ac- 
tion,"^ however,  Deity  further  says:  "But  of  the  two,  pur- 
suit of  action  is  superior  to  the  renunciation  of  action.''^  It 
is  quite  evident,  therefore,  that  the  renunciation  of  the  Yoga 
passes  from  that  of  action  itself  to  the  motive  for  action  and 
thus  reduces  the  ethical  subject  to  a  position  where  the  rule 
of  work  is  the  absence  of  all  expectation  of  reward  and  the 
complete  detachment  of  all  desire  from  activity,  or  as  Deity 
declares :  "I  will  speak  to  you  about  action,  and  learning  that, 
you  will  be  freed  from  this  world  of  evil.  He  is  wise  among 
men  who  sees  inaction  in  action,  and  action  in  inaction.  For- 
saking all  detachment  to  the  fruit  of  action,  always  con- 
tented, dependent  on  none,  he  does  nothing  at  all,  though  he 
engage  in  action."^  The  principle  underlying  this  ideal  of 
worklessness  is  that  life  itself  must  be  one  great  act  of  re- 
nunciation by  which  the  whole  is  dedicated  to  Brahman.  To 
Arguna's  plea  for  direction  in  attaining  the  highest  good. 
Deity  answers  by  saying:  "Dedicating  all  actions  to  me  with 
a  mind  knowing  the  relation  of  the  supreme  and  individual 
self."^  In  chapter  five  of  the  same  work,  Arguna  is  troubled 
with  what  seems  to  be  a  confusion  between  renunciation  and 
the  pursuit  of  action,  to  which  Deity  replies:  "He,  who  cast- 
ing off  all  attachment,  performs  actions  dedicating  them  to 
Brahman,  is  not  tainted  by  sin,  as  the  lotus-leaf  is  not  tainted 
by  water."  We  have  in  this  form  of  Hindoo  thinking  a 
world  abandonment  as  a  life  ideal  which  is  attained  by  re- 
nunciation in  the  form  of  worklessness.  This,  however,  is 
not  the  only  form  in  which  renunciation  appears  in  the  Yoga 
doctrine.  As  in  Taoism,  non-resentment  and  non-resistance 
are  definitely  advocated  but  upon  different  grounds.  If  in 
the  Taoistic  system,  resentment  and  resistance  must  be  re- 
nounced because  they  are  useless,  in  the  Yoga  they  must  be 


1.  Bhagavadgita.  ch.  3. 

2.  lb.,  ch.  5. 

3.  lb.,  ch.  4. 

4.  lb.,  ch.  3. 


14  The  Ethical  Ideal  of  Renunciation 

abandoned  because  they  are  injurious  to  the  individual  and 
serve  only  to  frustrate  his  attainment  of  Brahmic  bliss. 
While  the  Bhagavadgita  does  not  draw  any  such  direct  con- 
clusion, any  consistency  between  its  speculative  and  practical 
principles,  demands  that  non-resentment  and  non-resistance 
be  fundamental  to  a  system  where  the  Universal  Self  is  all 
and  the  individual  self  can  only  say,  aham  hrahma  asmi!  *'I 
am  Brahman."  Deity  not  only  claims  to  be  the  source  of 
forgiveness^  but  demands  it  of  the  Yogin :  "That  devotee  of 
mine,  who  hates  no  being,  who  is  friendly  and  compassionate, 
who  is  forgiving,  is  dear  to  me."  And  again :  "He  who  is 
alike  to  friend  and  foe,  as  also  in  honor  and  dishonor,  who 
is  alike  in  cold  and  heat,  pleasure  and  pain,  who  is  free  from 
attachments,  to  whom  praise  and  blame  are  alike,  is  dear  to 
me. "2  While  the  Bhagavadgita  thus  promulgates  a  more 
active  form  of  negation  than  Taoism  by  its  Yoga  of  renuncia- 
tion, it  makes  man  distrustful  of  existence  and  destroys  his 
sense  of  selfhood  by  taking  from  him  the  consciousness  of 
individuality  and  all  desire  for  personal  action.  However, 
such  an  ideal  goes  counter  to  man's  native  sense  of  selfhood. 
Man  is  not  content  to  believe  that  he  has  no  business  to  exist 
or  that  he  has  no  value  in  the  world.  It  is  not  strange, 
therefore,  that  over  against  the  negation  of  the  individual 
personality  of  the  Vedanta  with  its  practical  Yoga  of  re- 
nunciation, there  arises  a  reaction  in  which  the  self  becomes 
positive  and  while  not  possessing  satisfactory  value,  its  real 
problems  are  recognized  and  dealt  with  in  the  positive  fash- 
ion of  Buddhism  and  Christianity. 

3.  In  Buddhism  the  Universal  Self  of  the  Yoga  becomes 
the  subjective  self  of  the  individual.  The  metaphysical  prin- 
ciple of  the  Tao  and  Yoga  practically  disappears  and  in  its 
place,  the  individual  alone  exists.  Ethics  becomes  everything 
and  the  self  the  center  of  all  problems.  If  the  Yoga  found 
something  wrong  with  the  individual.  Buddhism  finds  every- 
thing wrong  with  the  individual  life  and  catching  up  the  weap- 
on of  renunciation  it  wields  it  with  more  deadly  power  than 


I,    Bhagavadgita,  ch.  10. 
2i.    Bhagavadgita,  ch.  12. 


Renunciation  in  Its  Historical  Development         15 

either  Taoism  or  the  Yoga.  Where  they  were  content  with 
negation  and  inactivity,  Buddhism  must  secure  the  complete 
annihilation  of  the  individual  self  and  thereby  of  all  things. 
Further  Buddhism  differs  from  these  older  negative  forms 
of  thought  in  seeking  the  final  redemption  of  man.  The 
nihilism  of  Taoism  and  the  worklessness  of  Yogaism 
are  only  temporary  measures  which  will  not  satisfy  the 
Buddhist.  Human  life  is  too  painful,  sorrowful  and  de- 
lusive; evil  too  persistent,  the  rebirth  of  the  soul  too  terrible, 
for  any  thing  to  be  sought  but  the  complete  extinguishment 
of  the  spark  of  the  soul  as  "Fire  goes  out  for  want  of  grass." 
The  motive  for  Buddhistic  renunciation  is  purely  pessimistic. 
"Birth,  decay,  death,  the  unpleasant  and  unsatisfied  craving, 
are  all  painful,"  but  these  are  the  condition  of  the  existence 
of  the  individual.^  To  escape  this  suffering,  it  is  necessary 
to  destroy  its  root  which  is  the  desire  for  the  gratification  of 
passion,  for  future  life  and  for  success  in  the  present  life.* 
This  craving  or  desire  is  overcome  by  means  of  a  series  of 
renunciatory  acts  summed  up  in  the  "Eight  fold  path."  By 
this  path  the  chain  of  causation,  so  fundamental  to  the 
Buddhistic  system,  is  counteracted  and  finally  overcome. 
When  this  chain  is  broken,  man  is  free  from  the  earthly 
bonds  and  from  the  re-birth  of  the  soul  and  attains  to  the 
desired  end  of  Nirvana  or  extinction  which  is  likened  to  the 
blowing  out  of  a  candle.  Buddhism  in  marshalling  its  forces 
against  desire,  attacks  the  very  stronghold  of  the  life  of 
man  and  in  reality  seeks  to  save  him  by  destroying  him.  This 
paradoxical  procedure  is  not  all  concealed  but  rather  set 
forth  in  the  spirit  of  exultation.  It  is  recorded  in  the  "Book 
of  the  Great  Decease"  that  when  the  Blessed  One  "Delib- 
erately and  consciously  rejected  the  rest  of  his  alloted  life" 
he  broke  out  in  this  hymn  of  rejoicing: 

"His  sum  of  life  the  sage  renounced, 
The  Cause  of  life  immeasurable  or  small; 
With  inward  joy  and  calm,  he  broke, 
Like  a  coat  of  mail,  his  life's  own  cause."' 


1.  Ppanattana  Sutta,  sec.  5. 

2.  lb.,  sees.  6,  7,  8. 

3.  lb.,  ch.  3:10. 


1 6  The  Ethical  Ideal  of  Renunciation 

This  breaking  of  the  cause  of  life  is  the  attainment  of 
Nirvana  which  is  not  annihilation  but  a  living  Arahatship,  a 
condition  of  human  existence  where  the  fires  of  lust,  hatred 
and  delusion  have  gone  out  by  a  process  of  contemplation 
and  asceticism  combined.  The  Arahat  has  reached  Nirvana 
but  continues  to  live  in  a  state  of  bliss,  like  the  "Gods  who 
feed  on  happiness."^  In  this  state  the  seeds  of  existence  are 
destroyed,  desire  and  the  sense  of  individuality  are  no  more 
and  like  a  dying  lamp,  the  Arahat  gradually  flickers  out  of 
existence  into  complete  and  absolute  annihilation.^  Like 
Taoism  and  Yogaism,  Buddhism  counsels  non-resentment 
and  non-resistance  but  upon  a  more  practical  basis,  in  fact 
they  are  the  natural  corollaries  of  the  system.  To  practice  re- 
sentment or  resistance  only  adds  to  the  strife  and  pain  of  life 
from  which  it  is  the  whole  end  of  man  to  escape.  "Angry 
speech  is  painful,  blows  for  blows  will  touch"  says  the  Dham- 
mapada.^  The  teachings  of  Jesus  are  anticipated  by  the 
declaration  that  "Hatred  does  not  cease  by  hatred  at  any 
time:  Hatred  ceases  by  love."^  The  Path  to  Nirvana  is 
further  described  as  one  where  anger  is  overcome  by  love, 
evil  by  good,  the  greedy  by  liberality,  the  liar  by  truth  and 
where  no  one  is  injured  by  another.^  Buddhistic  renuncia- 
tion is  thorough-going  in  all  its  aspects.  Its  foundation  is 
laid  deeply  in  the  weakest  sort  of  pessimism.  If  Taoism  can 
find  neither  a  home  nor  a  work  for  man  and  the  Yoga  robs 
him  of  all  purpose  and  motive.  Buddhism  finds  his  life  al- 
together evil  with  no  hope  but  utter  extinction  and  annihila- 
tion. 

4.  Christianity,  the  last  form  of  orientalism  to  be  con- 
sidered in  this  historical  survey,  like  the  systems  already  re- 
viewed, has  a  passion  for  renunciation  but  in  other  respects 
it  differs  very  fundamentally  from  these  systems.  Where 
both  Mongolian  and  Indian  thought  make  light  of  the  in- 


1.  Dhammapada,  sees.  197-200. 

2.  Rattana  Sutta,  sec.  14. 

3.  Sec.  133. 

4.  lb.,  sec.  5. 

5.  lb.,  sees.  223-225. 


Renunciation  in  Its  Historical  Development         17 

dividual  and  depreciate  his  worth,  Christianity  literally  dis- 
covers the  individual  and  posits  the  soul  over  against  the 
world.  It  repudiates  the  nihihsm  of  the  Tao,  the  pantheism 
of  the  Yoga  and  the  atheism  of  Buddhism  and  affirms  a 
thorough-going  theism.  Like  Buddhism,  Christianity  is  a 
life-system  which  Is  concerned  in  the  redemption  of  man  but 
where  Buddhism  would  rescue  man  by  annihilating  him, 
Christianity  redeems  him  by  a  positive  salvation  process 
based  upon  the  conception  of  human  values  which  Buddhism 
Is  unable  to  discover.  There  is  another  sharp  contrast  be- 
tween Christianity  and  the  other  oriental  systems  reviewed 
in  that  while  Taoism  has  an  empty  world  and  the  Vedanta 
a  worldless  self,  Christianity  affirms  a  world-soul  to  which 
man  stands  In  living  relation  but  with  which  he  can  never  be 
identified.  As  man  seeks  God  In  whom  he  lives  and  moves 
and  has  his  belng,^  it  is  not  that  he  may  be  Brahmically  ab- 
sorbed In  Deity  but  rather  that  his  own  personality  may  be 
preserved  by  right  relations  with  an  objective  God.  Sharper 
still  Is  the  contrast  between  the  inactivity,  so  characteristic 
of  the  Taolstic  and  Indian  thinking,  and  the  Christian  phil- 
osophy of  activity.  Jesus  was  no  ascetic.  He  was  the  doer 
of  mighty  deeds.  However,  the  activity  of  Christianity  is 
not  to  be  confused  with  the  form  of  activity  repudiated  by 
other  oriental  thought  but  Is  rather  to  be  conceived  as  the 
performance  of  a  mighty  deed  whereby  the  soul,  escaping 
the  world  of  nature,  becomes  engaged  In  the  great  spiritual 
tasks  of  filling  out  the  proportions  of  its  own  peculiar  nature. 
This  Is  the  meaning  of  the  paradoxical  teaching  of  Jesus: 
''Whosoever  shall  seek  to  gain  his  life  {ri]v \}n)xi]v)  shall  lose 
it;  but  whosoever  shall  lose  his  life  shall  preserve  It."^  The 
renunciation  advocated  by  Christianity  rests  upon  grounds 
both  thelstic  and  moral  and  proceeds  toward  a  goal  of  pos- 
itive values  for  man.  With  these  general  characteristics  of 
the  Christian  system  before  us,  we  shall  seek  to  exhibit  its 
requirements  for,  and  the  use  it  makes  of,  renunciation. 


1.  Acts  xvii:28. 

2.  Luke  xvii  133. 


1 8  The  Ethical  Ideal  of  Renunciation 

The  sharp  antithesis  which  Jesus  makes  between  the  flesh 
{(rapt)  and  the  spirit  {irvcv^a)  must  be  our  starting  point. 
The  uap^  is  the  hfe  of  the  natural  man  which  must  be  re- 
nounced in  favor  of  the  7ri/cv/>ia  which  is  a  higher  form  of  life 
known  as  C^  mwnos  with  the  world-order  of  its  own  //  BamXda 
rov  Oeov.  To  enter  this  kingdom,  Christianity  requires  the/xeravota 
by  which  a  man  repudiates  his  whole  life  of  conduct 
and  thought  as  completely  as  a  new  beginning  or  a  new 
birth. ^  Man  is  required  to  enter  into  the  Christian  life  by 
the  way  of  baptism  which  is  a  symbol  of  death^  and  pro- 
claim his  Christian  discipleship  by  the  use  of  the  Sacrament 
of  the  Lord's  Supper,  another  symbol  of  death. ^  The  de- 
sires and  values  of  the  man  of  nature  must  give  way  for  the 
new  desires  and  values  of  the  man  of  the  spirit.*  It  is  this 
transvaluation  of  values  which  drew  the  bitter  attack  of 
Nietzsche,  the  great  foe  of  the  Christian  system.  The  val- 
ue-judgment under  which  Christianity  proceeds  has  its  seat  in 
the  inner  and  personal  life.  "For  what  shall  a  man  be  prof- 
ited, if  he  shall  gain  the  whole  world,  and  forfeit  his  life?  or 
what  shall  a  man  give  in  exchange  for  his  life."^  As  com- 
pared with  the  soul  values,  earthly  possessions  must  occupy  a 
lower  plane  nor  do  they  contribute  to  these  values.^  The 
abandonment  of  worldly  goods  is  not  because  they  are  essen- 
tially evil,  as  Buddhism  declares,  but  they  stand  in  the  way 
of  a  higher  good.  When  the  wealthy  young  man  sought  en- 
trance into  the  kingdom,  he  was  told  by  Jesus  to  sell  all  he 
possessed  and  distribute  the  proceeds  to  the  poor.'^  Christian 
renunciation  may  even  extend  to  the  maiming  of  the  physical 
body.  If  the  hand  or  the  foot  or  the  eye  leads  estray,  it  is 
to  be  taken  from  the  body.^  Separation  from  one's  own  fam- 
ily and  relatives  and  the  very  hating  of  one's  own  life  are 


1.  Matt.  iv:i7  with  John  iii:3. 

2.  Rom.  vi:5. 

3.  I  Cor.  xi:26. 

4.  Gal.  v:  19-22. 

5.  Matt.  xvi:26. 

6.  Luke  xii:is. 

7.  Mark  x:2i. 

8.  Mark  ix  :43{. 


Renunciation  in  Its  Historical  Development         19 

counselled  by  Jesus/  and  finally  this  renunciation  extends  to 
the  sacrificing  of  earthly  life  itself:  "Whosoever  doth  not 
bear  his  own  cross  (Roman  instrument  of  execution)  and 
come  after  me,  cannot  be  my  disciple. "^  Under  the  figures  of 
the  tower  builder  and  the  king  going  to  war,  Jesus  teaches 
that  this  painful  renunciation  must  be  deliberately  and 
thoughtfully  accomplished.^  Nothing  less  than  the  complete 
abandonment  of  the  man  of  nature  with  his  desires  and  pos- 
sessions can  satisfy  the  Christian  ideal.  "Whosoever  he  be  of 
you  that  renounceth  not  all  that  he  hath,  he  cannot  be  my  dis- 
ciple."^ It  was  under  the  realization  of  the  thorough-going 
renunciation  of  the  Christian  system  which  led  Luther  to 
say:  "Have  done  with  thy  body,  goods,  honor,  child  and 
wife;  let  them  go."  (Nehmen  sie  Leib,  Gut,  Ehr,  Kind  und 
Weib,  Lass  fahren  dahn.)^ 

In  the  teachings  of  St.  Paul,  Christian  renunciation  takes 
a  specific  direction  which  can  be  summed  up  under  the  phrase 
"The  Road  to  Damascus,"  that  is  to  say  the  great  renuncia- 
tion which  followed  his  conversion  to  Christianity  becomes 
for  him  the  ideal  form.  Like  the  modern  Huysmans,  St. 
Paul  sets  down  his  conversion  to  the  mercy  and  grace  of 
God  and  from  this  conviction  he  develops  his  doctrine  of  the 
invalidity  of  works  of  merit.  The  value  element  in  Chris- 
tianity for  St.  Paul  is  the  KcuVo-n/s  ^0)17?^  but  for  the  attaining 
of  which  he  absolutely  distrusts  human  activity.  He  seems 
almost  Taoistic  in  his  demand  that  so  far  as  attempting  to 
perform  the  requirements  of  the  ceremonial  or  moral  law, 
one  had  better  do  nothing:  "Neither  circumcision  availeth 
anything  nor  uncircumcision."*^  The  moral  law  is  as  helpless 
as  the  ceremonial:  "By  the  works  of  the  law  shall  no  flesh 


1.  Luke  xiv:26. 

2.  Luke  xiv  127. 

3.  Luke  xiv:28, 

4.  Luke  xiv:33. 

5.  Quoted  by  Wendt  "The  Teaching  of  Jesus,"  tr.  John  Wilson,  Vol. 
II,  ch.  vii,  sec.  3. 

6.  Rom.  vi.,  4. 

7.  Gal.  v.,  6. 


20  The  Ethical  Ideal  of  Renunciation 

be  justified."^  Having  thus  cleared  the  way,  St.  Paul  states 
his  great  thesis  of  Christianity:  "A  man  is  justified  by  faith 
apart  from  the  works  of  the  law."^  This  faith  he  makes 
the  gift  of  the  supernatural^  and  teaches  the  necessity  for  a 
quiescent  state  in  which  man  renounces  all  personal  merit 
and  self  activity.^  Like  other  forms  of  oriental  thought, 
Christianity  affirms  the  necessity  of  practicing  non-resent- 
ment and  non-resistance,  but  upon  theistic  grounds.  Jesus 
teaches  the  love  of  enemies  and  the  non-resistance  of  evil  be- 
cause such  a  course  exhibits  a  certain  Divine  likeness.^  St. 
Paul  makes  the  practice  of  non-resistance  a  preparation  for 
the  play  of  Divine  justice:  ''Avenge  not  yourselves,  beloved, 
but  give  place  unto  the  wrath  of  God."^ 

These  renunciatory  teachings  of  Christianity  bore  fruit 
in  practical  life  in  many  and  various  ways,  often  in  extremx 
forms  and  also  suffered  certain  modifications  as  Christianity 
took  its  way  from  its  oriental  home  of  inactivity  and  quies- 
cence to  the  more  active  conception  of  life  as  held  by  Pagan 
culture  in  the  Roman  Empire.  The  conflict  between  Pagan- 
ism and  Christianity  was  very  sharp  and  when  the  latter  won 
the  day,  humanity  experienced  one  of  the  greatest  revolu- 
tions of  history.  Because  of  the  universal  appeal  of  Chris- 
tianity and  its  conception  of  its  task  of  converting  the  whole 
race  of  mankind,  this  revolution  concerned  more  than  Euro- 
pean races  but  effected  the  human  interests  of  a  world.  This 
revolution  meant  nothing  else  than  the  complete  overthrow 
of  all  life's  theories  which  Nietzsche  terms  the  "Transvalua- 
tion  of  all  values."  This  transformation  of  values  made  its 
mark  deeply  upon  all  religious  and  philosophic  thinking  of 
medievalism  and  modernity.  Where  Pagan  culture  affirmed 
the  world  of  nature  and  made  self-preservation  the  first  law, 
Christianity  denied  the  world  and  taught  the  losing  of  self. 


I. 

Gal.  ii.,  16. 

2. 

Rom.  iii.,  28. 

3- 

Eph.  ii,  8. 

4. 

Rom.  iii,  19. 

5. 

Matt.  38ff. 

6. 

Rom.  xiiriQ. 

Renunciation  in  Its  Historical  Development         21 

For  the  self-assertive  virtues  of  courage,  justice,  and  tem- 
perance as  these  were  conceived  by  pagan  thinkers,  Chris- 
tianity substituted  the  submissive  virtues  of  patience, 
non-resentment,  non-resistance  and  abstention.  Hu- 
mility was  put  in  the  place  of  ambition,  silence  In  the  place 
of  eloquence,  pity  and  mercy  In  the  place  of  the  natural  vir- 
tues of  the  Greeks.  In  fact  the  virtues  of  the  Greek  and 
Roman  morality  were  considered  by  such  Christian  thinkers 
as  Augustine  but  splendid  vices.  In  practical  life,  therefore, 
the  negative  position  of  Christianity  found  expression  in 
many  extreme  ethical  practices  as  witnessed  by  such  move- 
ments as  Gnosticism,  Monasticism  and  other  forms  of  as- 
ceticism. Especially  Is  it  worthy  to  note  the  place  of  the  *'Fia 
negativa''  of  the  Mystics,  a  form  of  renunciation  which  pre- 
dominated In  the  medieval  period.  The  '^Fia  negativa**  has 
its  roots  In  the  teachings  of  Augustine  who  took  the  position 
that  life  has  no  meaning  apart  from  God  and  union  with 
God  is  the  highest  end  of  man.^  Augustine  divorced  the  will 
from  the  human  consciousness  and  found  It  wholly  incapable 
of  moral  or  spiritual  conquest,  therefore  there  is  nothing 
which  man  can  do  and  his  salvation  Is  wholly  determined  by 
the  arbitrary  will  of  God.  For  those  whom  God  determines 
to  redeem  there  exists  the  "Momentous  WIU."^  Like  St. 
Paul,  Augustine  does  away  with  all  works  of  human  merit  as 
useless.  It  Is  by  surrender  that  man  comes  into  union  with  the 
Divine  but  this  union  demands  the  contempt  of  self:  "The 
two  cities  have  been  formed  by  two  loves:  the  earthly  love 
of  self,  even  to  the  contempt  of  God;  the  heavenly  by  the 
love  of  God  even  to  the  contempt  of  self."^  It  was  left  for 
Dionyslus  to  coin  the  phrase  ^^Via  negativa'*  which  he  con- 
trasts with  the  ^'Fia  afirmata'*  and  Illustrates  It  by  the  figure 
of  the  sculptor  who  "Cuts  away  all  superfluous  material  and 
brings  to  light  the  beauty  hidden  within,  so  we  negate  every- 
thing in  order  that  without  veils  we  may  know  that  Un- 


1.  Confessions,  tr.,  J.  G.  Pilkingston,  bk.,  I,  ch.  I. 

2.  Confessions,  bk.  viii,  chs,  8.  9. 

3.  City  of  God,  bk.  v,  ch.  18. 


22  The  Ethical  Ideal  of  Renunciation 

known  who  Is  concealed  by  all  the  light  in  existing  things."^ 
It  is  this  road  which  leads  to  that  "Union  above  all  thought, 
above  the  states  of  consciousness,  above  all  knowledge. "^ 
Those  who  follow  this  road  will  lay  aside  all  mental  energies 
and  by  pure  contemplation  will  participate  "With  unim- 
passioned  and  immaterial  mind."^  This  "Via  negativa"  pro- 
vides for  Albertus  Magnus  a  state  of  quiescence  and  mental 
inactivity  which  appears  Buddhistic  in  character:  "Nothing 
pleases  God  more  than  a  mind  free  from  all  occupations  and 
distractions.  Such  a  mind  is  In  a  manner  transformed  into 
God;  other  creatures  and  itself  It  sees  only  in  God."*  Again 
in  German  mysticism,  the  ''Fia  negativa"  holds  sway  in  the 
thinking  of  Tauler  who  advocates  the  poverty  of  the  inner 
life,  entire  resignation  and  the  absolute  denial  of  self  and 
all  self-love.^  The  hold  which  the  *'Via  negativa^^  had  upon 
the  minds  of  ethical  thinkers  through  the  medieval  period  is 
well  summed  up  by  Inge:  "God  can  best  be  described  by 
negatives,  discovered  by  the  stripping  off  of  all  qualities  and 
attributes  which  veil  him.  He  can  only  be  reached  by  di- 
vesting ourselves  of  all  the  distinctions  of  personality  and  the 
sinking  or  the  rising  into  our  'uncreated  nothingness,'  and 
he  can  only  be  Imitated  by  aiming  at  an  abstract  spirituality, 
the  passionless  'apathy'  of  an  universal  which  is  nothing  In 
particular."^ 

But  while  medieval  life  was  seemingly  dominated  by  the 
Christian  Ideals  of  self-denial  and  world-abandonment,  there 
were  undercurrents  of  life  and  thought  which  escaping  this 
domination  found  expression  in  the  life  of  the  Germanic  na- 
tions, which  were  never  converted  to  Christianity  as  such  but 
only  to  the  Church.  Therefore,  along  with  the  poetry  of  the 
Church  with  Its  dream  of  deliverance  from  world-weariness 
and  Its  exaltation  of  the  passive  virtues  of  patience  and  obed- 


1.  Mys.  Theo.,  ch.  2:1. 

2.  Div.  name,  ch.  14. 

3.  lb. 

4.  De  adhaerendo  Deo,  quoted  by  Inge,  Christian  Mysticism.   Lecture  iv. 

5.  The  Inner  Way,  tr.  A.  W.  Hutton. 

6.  Christian  Mysticism,  Lecture  iii. 


Renunciation  in  Its  Historical  Development         23 

ience,  there  flourished  the  epic  poem  with  its  heroes  and  its 
heroines,  its  virtues  of  ferocious  courage  and  hatred  of 
enemies.  It  is  not  without  significance  that  such  an  exhibition 
of  heroism  and  strength  as  is  embodied  in  the  Nibelungen- 
lied  should  be  a  product  of  medieval  life.  While  the  epic 
was  exploiting  the  hero  of  strength,  the  lyric  was  singing  of 
the  joy  of  life  and  the  love  of  the  world.  Even  St.  Paul's 
discount  of  worldly  wisdom  was  not  generally  accepted  and 
the  teachings  of  Christianity  were  cast  into  the  rationalistic 
moulds  of  Scholastic  theology.  It  was  this  counter-move- 
ment, which  smouldering  in  the  Middle  Ages,  finally  burst 
forth  and  ushered  in  the  modern  era  with  its  two  great 
revolutions:  the  Renaissance  and  the  Reformation.  The 
former,  with  its  ardent  admiration  for  the  Pagan  ideals  of 
life,  was  a  rebellion  against  the  Christian  renunciation  of  the 
world  and  the  denial  of  self.  The  latter  was  a  rebellion 
against  the  dead  dogmas  and  authority  of  the  Church  but 
agreed  with  the  Renaissance  in  the  desire  for  freedom  and 
individualism.  The  Reformation  did  not  turn  from  the 
Christian  ideals  of  self-denial  and  world-estrangement  but 
rather  from  the  false  ways  into  which  these  had  fallen. 
Luther  considered  the  earth  but  a  vale  of  tears  and  de- 
manded self-denial  of  the  most  thorough-going  character.  It 
was  this  element  in  the  Reformation  which  served  to  check 
the  Renaissance  movement  toward  a  worldly  life  and  artistic 
culture,  especially  in  northern  Europe.  But  whatever  be 
the  historical  relation  of  the  two  movements,  they  made  pos- 
sible the  rise  of  the  rationalistic  spirit  which  is  the  character- 
istic of  the  modern  era.  It  is  the  work  of  this  spirit  which 
opened  a  new  era  for  the  ethical  ideal  of  renunciation. 

B.    Modernity,— Rationalistic  Withdrawal  from 

Nature. 

Amid  the  profound  changes  wrought  by  the  revival  of 
learning,  the  consequent  breaking  of  traditional  authority, 
the  rise  of  freedom  and  individualism  and  the  ascendency 


24  The  Ethical  Ideal  of  Renunciation 

of  the  autonomy  of  reason,  renunciation  emerges  as  a  prob- 
lem within  the  nature  of  man.  Up  to  the  dawning  of  mod- 
ernity, it  had  served  to  relate  man  to  some  external  principle 
as  the  nihilistic  metaphysics  of  the  Tao,  or  the  Brahman  of 
the  Yoga,  the  Nirvana  of  Buddhism  or  the  Kingdom  of  God 
of  Christianity  or  in  other  words  its  field  was  metaphysical 
and  moral  but  with  the  entrance  of  the  modern  spirit,  its 
field  became  rationalistic. 

The  great  problem  raised  by  Descartes  (1596-1650)  was 
the  interaction  of  mind  and  body.  He  conceived  of  matter 
and  mind  as  distinct  substances  absolutely  independent  of  one 
another.  The  body  has  extension  for  its  essential  attribute 
while  the  mind  has  thought.  The  former  has  nothing  of 
thought  and  the  latter  nothing  of  extension,  therefore,  ex- 
tended substance  and  thinking  substance  have  nothing  what- 
ever in  common.  The  two  substances  are  entirely  opposed  to 
each  other  and  absolutely  exclude  one  another.  There  can  be 
no  reciprocal  action  between  them,  the  attributes  of  each  ex- 
cluding the  other  from  the  very  nature  of  their  constitution. 
Therefore  the  seeming  interaction  of  body  and  mind  can  not 
exist.  In  this  abrupt  and  dogmatic  fashion,  Descartes  created 
the  dualism  between  mind  and  matter  which  lead  Hobbes  and 
the  Materialists  to  cry:  "There  is  no  spiritual  substance*'  and 
Berkley  and  the  Idealists  to  say  "There  are  no  bodies.'* 
However,  there  is  a  reciprocal  relation  between  body  and 
mind  which  can  not  be  so  dismissed  and  Descartes,  while 
never  identifying  matter  and  mind,  does  not  deny  the  in- 
teraction but  ascribes  it  to  the  power  of  God.  By  this  aban- 
donment of  any  attempt  to  explain  upon  natural  grounds  this 
interaction  of  body  and  mind,  Descartes  opened  the  way  for 
the  rise  of  Occasionalism  as  formulated  by  the  Cartesians, 
Cordemoy  and  De  La  Forge  and  systematically  developed 
by  Arnold  Geulincx  (1624-69)  and  Nicolas  Malebranche 
(163  8-17 15).  Occasionalism  is  the  theory  of  causae  oc- 
casionales.  Since  neither  body  nor  mind  can  effect  each 
other  in  any  way,  it  is  God  "on  the  occasion"  of  physical 
stimulus  produces  the  sensation  in  the  mind  and  "on  the  oc- 


Renunciation  in  Its  Historical  Development         25 

caslon"  of  a  determination  of  the  will,  produces  the  bodily 
movements.  Geulincx  bases  his  occasionalistic  position  upon 
the  Cartesian  principle :  "Cogito,  ergo  sum."  All  knowledge 
rests  upon  the  certainty  of  self  and  all  activity  upon  con- 
sciousness. Any  activity  of  which  I  have  no  knowledge  is 
not  mine:  "Quod  nescis,  quomodo  fiat,  id  non  facis,"  (Un- 
less I  know  how  an  event  happens,  I  am  not  the  cause.)  It  is 
upon  this  principle  that  Geulincx  builds  his  system.  If  I  am 
not  the  cause,  there  must  be  some  cause  for  this  activity.  A 
decision  of  the  will  does  effect  bodily  movements  and  sense- 
stimuli  produce  sensations  in  the  mind  but  I  am  ignorant  of 
how  the  will  influences  the  body,  and  the  body,  from  its 
nature,  can  not  effect  the  mind,  therefore  both  bodily  move- 
ments and  mental  sensations  are  produced  by  God.  Sense- 
stimulus  or  will-decision  serve  only  as  the  occasion  for  the 
Divine  activity.  It  follows  from  this  metaphysical  position 
that  the  individual  has  no  power  beyond  the  mere  act  of 
willing  and  the  ethical  system  of  Geulincx  is  a  natural  and 
logical  deduction  from  his  metaphysical  principles.  Since 
we  can  effect  nothing  in  the  material  world,  why  will  any- 
thing? God  does  not  require  works  but  dispositions  for  the 
results  of  volition  are  beyond  our  power.  "Ubi  nihil  vales, 
ibi  nihil  velis" — (Where  thou  canst  do  nothing,  there  will 
nothing.)  This  is  the  ethical  principle  for  Geulincx  and 
from  it  he  deduces  our  moral  vocation  which  consists  in  the 
renunciation  of  the  world  and  the  retirement  into  ourselves. 
In  developing  this  ethical  system,  Geulincx  makes  virtue  to 
be:  "Amor  Dei  ac  Rationis" — (The  love  of  God  and  Rea- 
son.)^ The  foundamental  principle  is  the  love  of  reason 
which  is  the  law  of  God  in  us.  Reason  gives  us  the  true 
knowledge  of  self  and  it  is  the  highest  virtue  to  bring  our 
wills  and  actions  into  harmony  with  this  knowledge.  Our 
love  to  God  must  be  self-renouncing  and  obedient  but  as 
an  ethical  principle,  love  of  reason  is  to  be  prefered:  "Virtus 
potius  est  amor  Rationis.*'^    Geulincx  discusses  the  four  car- 


1.  Ethica,  Tr.  I,  cap.  I,  sec.  2. 

2.  lb.,  Tr.  I,  cap.  I,  sec.  2. 


26  The  Ethical  Ideal  of  Renunciation 

dinal  virtues  or  properties  of  moral  excellence  (Virtues  Car- 
dlnales  sunt  Proprletates  Virtutls.)  These  are  Diligentia, 
Obedientia,  Justitia  and  Humilitas.^  By  Diligentia  is  meant 
the  listening  to  the  commands  of  reason  (Diligentia  est  aus- 
cultation. )2  The  result  of  listening  and  waiting  for  the  voice 
of  reason  is  wisdom  (Frustus  Diligentia  est  prudentia)  but 
wisdom  In  the  sense  of  prudence.^  Obedientia  is  executing 
the  commands  of  reason  (Obedientia  est  executio  ratlonls.)* 
It  has  two  parts;  to  omit  what  reason  prohibits  and  to  do 
what  reason  commands  (Partes  Obedientia  sunt  duae: 
Facere  &  Mittere,  quod  vetat  Ratio,  facere  quod  jubet.)^ 
Obedientia  is  the  way  to  human  liberty.  "Obedientia  est  Lib- 
ertas:  Nemini  enim  servit,  qui  RatlonI  servit,  sed  llberrimus 
est  hoc  ipso:  facit  quod  vult" — (Obedience  Is  liberty,  for  he 
serves  no  one  who  serves  reason  but  is  free  himself.  He 
does  what  he  wishes.)^  The  third  cardinal  virtue  Is  Justitia 
which  is  conforming  the  whole  conduct  of  life  to  what  reason 
says  Is  right  (Justitia  est  adaequatio  ratlonls.)^  There  are 
also  two  parts  of  the  Justitia:  purity  and  perfection.  The 
former  removes  what  is  excessive  and  is  the  right  arm  of 
justice,  while  the  latter  supplies  what  is  lacking  and  is  the 
left  hand  of  justice  (Purltas  resecat  quod  nimis  est:  estque 
velut  dexterum  brachium  Justitia:  Perfectio  supplet  quod 
minus  est;  estque  velut  sinistra.)®  That  which  is  excessive 
in  our  lives  is  vice  (Vltlum  per  excessum)  and  that  which  is 
lacking  is  also  vice  (Vitlum  per  defectum.)  By  equalizing 
the  excessive  and  defective,  Justitia  leads  to  satiety  and  satis- 
faction (Frustus  Justitia  est  Satletas.)^  Our  worthiest  inner 
feelings  find  satisfaction  In  justice  as  Geulincx  conceives  it. 
Finally,  Humilitas  the  recognition  of  our  impotence  is  ac- 


I. 

Ethica,  Tr.  I,  cap.  II. 

2. 

lb.,  Tr.  I,  cap.  II,  sec.  i. 

3- 

lb.,  Tr.  I,  cap.  II,  sec.  i. 

4. 

lb.,  Tr.  I,  cap.  II,  sec.  2. 

5- 

lb.,  sec.  2:2. 

6. 

lb.,  sec.  2:4. 

7- 

lb.,  sec.  3:1. 

8. 

lb.,  sec.  3:1. 

9 

lb.,  Tr.  I,  cap.  II,  sec.  3:4 

Renunciation  in  Its  Historical  Development         27 

cording  to  Geulincx  the  sum  of  all  the  cardinal  virtues  (Vir- 
tutem  Cardinalium  summa)  and  is  defined  as  "Contempt  of 
self  because  of  love  of  God  and  Reason"  (Humilitas  est  con- 
temptio  sui  prae  Amore  Dei  ac  Rationis.)  ^  It  is  this  cardinal 
virtue  which  leads  us  into  the  very  heart  of  the  ethical  sys- 
tem of  Geulincx.  By  ''Contemptio  siii'^  he  does  not  mean  a 
positive  contempt  of  self  but  a  negative  contempt;  "Con- 
temptlo,  inquam,  non  positiva,  sed  negativa."^  Humilitas 
does  not  require  that  one  condemn  himself  positively,  defame 
himself,  beat  himself,  or  otherwise  do  evil  to  himself:  that 
indeed  is  not  humility  per  se :  but  it  is  the  greatest  madness, 
for  reason  per  se  enjoins  no  such  thing  upon  us."^  While 
there  may  be  necessity  for  a  positive  contempt  of  self  as  the 
confession  of  a  crime  or  the  cutting  away  of  incurable  por- 
tions of  the  body,  such  a  course  is  not  humility  which  re- 
quires the  negative  contempt  of  the  self.*  Geulincx  divides 
this  virtue  into  two  parts :  **Inspectio  ^  Despectio  suiJ'^  By 
the  former  he  means,  like  Socrates,  "Know  thyself"  by  ac- 
curate investigation  and  by  the  latter,  the  despising  and  the 
surrendering  of  the  self  to  God  as  the  consequence  of  '7w- 
spectio  suiJ* 

Proceeding  to  inspect  the  self,  Geulincx  begins  with  self- 
consciousness  and  studies  the  relation  between  mind  and  body. 
He  is  unable  to  discover  any  connection  or  interaction  be- 
tween them.  He  wills  and  bodily  movements  follow  but  how 
he  does  not  know.  He  says  "Sed  motum  ego  ilium  non 
facio:  nescio  enim  quomodo  peragatur"  (But  I  did  not  make 
that  motion;  I  do  not  know  how  it  is  done.)^  Further  he 
says:  "Nescio  enim,  quomodo,  &  per  quos  nervos,  aut  alias 
vias,  motus  e  cerebro  in  artus  meos  derivetur?  nescio  quo- 
modo ad  ipsum  cerebrum  perveniat?  &  an  perveniat?  (I  do 
not  even  know  how  and  through  what  nerves  or  other  ways  a 


1.  Ethica,  sec.  2:1. 

2.  lb.,  sec.  2:1. 

3.  lb.,  sec.  2:1. 

4.  lb.,  sec.  2:1. 

5.  lb.,  sec.  2:1. 

6.  lb.,  Tr.  I,  sec.  2 :2. 


28  The  Ethical  Ideal  of  Renunciation 

motion  from  my  brain,  is  directed  to  my  limbs;  I  do  not 
know  how  it  reached  that  very  brain,  and  whether  it  did.)^ 
If  there  is  an  union  between  body  and  mind,  who  is  the  cause 
of  it?  Geulincx  does  not  believe  that  it  can  be  the  individual 
for  he  does  not  know  how  the  union  takes  place  or  that  it 
takes  place  at  all.  As  a  result  of  the  inspection  of  self, 
Geulincx  comes  to  this  conclusion  "J^"^  itaque  novi  condi- 
tionem  mean,  Nudus  sum  hujusce  Mundi  contemplator ;  spec- 
tator sum  in  hac  scena,  non  actor."  (Thus  now  I  know  my 
condition:  I  am  only  a  contemplator  of  this  world;  a  specta- 
tor am  I  in  this  scene,  not  an  actor.  )^  How  he  came  into 
such  a  condition,  Geulincx  declares  he  does  not  know  and 
concludes  that  God  alone  causes  him  to  see  the  spectacle. 
The  consequence  of  this  inspection  of  self  is  '^Despectio  sui/' 
This  is  the  other  part  of  humility  and  its  complement  (Altera 
pars  Humilitas  est  sui  Despectio;  Haec  est  Humilitatis  com- 
plementum.)^  Geulincx  defines  despectio  sui  as  follows: 
"Consistit  ea  Despectio  in  mei  ipsius  derelictione,  qua  ego 
Deo,  cujus,  ut  vidi  totus  sum"  (This  contempt  con- 
sists in  the  abandoning  of  myself,  by  which  I  surrender  all 
to  God  whose,  as  I  have  seen,  I  am  entire.)*  The  individual 
thus  is  nothing  and  God  is  all.  Man  has  no  will  and  God  is 
all  will.  Man  is  only  a  tool  in  the  hand  of  God  and  hence 
man's  greatest  virtue  is  to  be  a  willing  tool.  Certain  obliga- 
tions follow  the  '^Contemptio  sui."  Primarily  we  must  will 
nothing:  '^Ubi  nihil  valeo,  ibi  nihil  volo.  .  .  nihil  valeo 
denotat  inspectionem  sui,  nihil  volo  denotat  despectionem 
sui."  (Where  I  effect  nothing,  there  I  will  nothing. 
I  effect  nothing  marks  the  inspection  of  self,  I  will  nothing 
marks  the  contempt  of  self.)^  Another  moral  obligation  is 
to  preserve  our  lives.  Since  we  are  here  by  the  will  of  God, 
It  is  our  duty  to  abide  here  until  he  commands  "Non  exire 
ex  hac  vita,  nisi  Deus  revocaverit."  (Not  to  depart  from  this 


I. 

Ethica,  sec.  2 :2. 

2. 

lb.,  Tr.  I,  sec.  II 

3- 

lb.,  iii:i. 

4 

lb.,  iii:i. 

5. 

lb.,  iv:i. 

11,  II 


Renunciation  in  Its  Historical  Development         ig 

life  unless  God  recalls.)  ^  Geulincx  was  a  sharp  opponent  of 
suicide.  We  must  abide  by  the  will  of  God  even  if  circum- 
stances of  life  be  dreadful  and  we  be  threatened  with  a  thou- 
sand deaths.^  It  is  not  only  our  duty  to  preserve  our  lives 
but  to  preserve  the  race.  Man  is  under  obligation  to  pro- 
create: "Sicut  edere  debeo,  ut  ego  hie  maneam  sic  &  aliqui 
generare  debent,  ut  genus  humanum  hie  maneat."  (Just  as 
I  ought  to  eat  that  I  may  remain  here,  so  even  ought  we  to 
procreate  that  the  race  of  men  may  remain  here.)^  Here 
Geulincx  is  in  sharp  oppostion  to  the  Buddhist  and  Schopen- 
hauer who  advocate  the  extinction  of  the  race  as  the  great- 
est blessing  for  mankind.  Unlike  Taoism,  Geulincx  believes 
in  work  and  activity  but  only  so  far  as  they  make  for  the 
preservation  of  the  self  and  posterity  and  must  be  free  from 
all  self-interest  that  every  thing  may  be  submitted  to  God. 
In  this  respect  Geulincx  approaches  the  Yoga  doctrine.  Dis- 
cussing the  question  of  happiness,  he  believes  that  man  is  un- 
happy because  he  seeks  happiness,  '*Umbra  est  felicitas;  fugit 
te,  cum,  sequeris  sam;  sequiturte,  cum  fugis."  (Happiness 
is  a  shadow;  it  flees  you  when  you  follow  it  and  it  follows 
you  when  you  flee  it.)*  Happiness  is  not  attained  by  pursuing 
it  but  it  will  pursue  those  who  flee  from  it.  Man  must  take 
care  of  his  obligation  to  God  and  he  will  have  no  time  to 
pursue  happiness.  His  premises  granted,  Geulincx  is  logical 
to  the  end.  If  we  are  related  to  the  world  as  mere  specta- 
tors, totally  unable  to  effect  any  thing  in  it,  then  our  ethical 
vocation  must  consist  in  renouncing  the  world,  obediently 
fulfilling  the  obligations  consequent  upon  inspectio  sui.  Ac- 
cording to  Geulincx,  therefore,  the  highest  morality  is  the 
willing  submission  to  God  founded  upon  a  thorough  con- 
temptio  sui. 

The  Cartesian  schism  between  mind  and  body  not  only 
profoundly  influenced  Geulincx  and  his  ethical  system  but 


1.  Ethica,  Tr.  I,  sec,  II,  v. 

2.  lb.,  v:3. 

3.  lb.,  vi  :2. 

4.  lb.,  Tr.  I,  sec.  II,  pt,  11, 


30  The  Ethical  Ideal  of  Renunciation 

It  affected  certain  of  his  contemporaries  along  similar  lines. 
For  Nicolas  Malebranche,  the  problem  of  mind  and  body 
maintained  its  reality  and  Occasionalism  offered  the  only 
solution.  However,  where  God  was  the  actor  for  Geullncx, 
he  became  the  thinker  for  Malebranche  "God  is  the  intelligi- 
ble world  or  the  place  of  minds,  as  the  material  world  is  the 
place  of  bodies."^  We  see,  therefore,  the  material  world 
only  because  God  reveals  it  to  us.  He  is  to  the  mind  what 
light  is  to  the  eye.  As  the  eye  dwells  in  light,  so  the  mind 
is  in  God,  thinks  in  God  and  sees  in  God.  Objects  are  ideas 
in  God  in  archetypal  form  and  we  being  in  God,  see  objects 
through  these  ideas  so  that  all  knowledge  consists  In  seeing 
as  God  sees.  It  follows  then  that  if  all  knowledge  consists 
In  knowing  God,  all  morality  consists  In  loving  God.  The 
error  of  life  comes  from  the  fact  that  the  soul  is  united  to 
the  body  as  well  as  to  God  and  the  sensuous  rises  and  mingles 
with  the  ideas  from  God  and  the  will  is  misled.  The  true 
conduct  of  life,  therefore  consists  in  making  the  body  sub- 
ordinate to  the  mind,  subduing  the  passions,  all  of  which 
amounts  to  a  decided  asceticism.  Like  Geullncx,  Male- 
branche can  find  no  place  for  man's  will.  He  has  no  will. 
God  is  all  will  and  the  human  virtue  Is  to  surrender  every- 
thing, body,  passions,  will  and  the  world  for  the  love  of 
God  that  we  may  be  able  to  think  his  thoughts  purely  and 
absolutely. 

With  Spinoza,  the  schism  of  Carteslanism  disappears. 
Thought  and  extension  become  attributes  of  one  substance, 
God,  impersonal  and  unintelligible  and  with  indifferent  will. 
Soul  Is  but  the  modification  of  the  thought  of  God  and 
body  but  the  modification  of  his  substance.  Will  and  In- 
tellect are  identical  in  their  essence.  As  a  part  of  the  Divine 
Being  we  are  passive  beings,  limited.  Impotent  and  the  slave 
of  things.  Our  freedom  comes  through  the  knowledge  of 
things  as  they  are.  A  passion  ceases  to  be  a  passion  as  soon 
as  we  know  its  real  nature.     Morality  is  the  knowledge  of 


I.    The  Search  after  truth,  tr.  T.  Taylor,  pt.  II,  ch.  6. 


Renunciation  in  Its  Historical  Development         31 

things  as  they  are.  *'The  highest  good  of  the  mind  is  the 
knowledge  of  God,  and  the  highest  virtue  of  the  mind  is 
to  know  God."^  To  be  virtuous  is  to  act  in  accordance  with 
this  knowledge.  This  is  similar  to  Guelincx.  In  fact  the 
"Amor  intellectualis  Dei"  of  Spinoza^  corresponds  with  the 
"Amor  Dei  et  rationis"  of  GeuHncx.  Spinoza  would  make 
the  highest  end  of  conduct  a  constant  and  eternal  love  of 
God  and  consequently,  man's  attitude  toward  the  world  must 
be  one  of  mental  acquiescence.  Necessity  and  joyful  resigna- 
tion sum  up  the  ethical  teachings  of  Spinoza. 

It  is  quite  evident  that  the  ultimate  end  of  these  lines  of 
thought  from  Cartesianism  through  Geulincx,  Malebranche 
and  Spinoza  would  be  a  determinism  of  pronounced  char- 
acter. God  becomes  the  real  agent  and  man  but  a  will-less  and 
passive  being.  This  particular  form  of  thought  found  an  un- 
willing mind  in  another  thinker  of  this  period  who  also  was 
influenced  by  Cartesianism, — Blaise  Pascal  (1623-62).  He 
turned  away  from  reason  fpr  it  failed  to  satisfy  and  from 
nature  because  it  made  him  pessimistic  and  took  refuge  in 
the  feelings.  In  a  sense  Pascal  resembled  Kant.  As  Kant 
did  away  with  speculative  reason  to  make  a  place  for  the 
practical  reason,  Pascal  put  away  all  natural  philosophy  and 
turned  to  ethics  where  he  believed  there  was  stability.  God 
is  not  conceived  through  reason  but  felt  by  the  heart  is  Pas- 
cal's principle.  Sin  has  driven  out  our  love  for  God  with 
which  we  were  created  and  self-love  has  taken  its  place.  Our 
moral  vocation,  therefore,  consists  in  hating  and  renouncing 
self  and  despising  the  world  in  order  to  make  a  place  for  the 
grace  of  God.  The  merit  of  human  volition  is  in  not  re- 
sisting this  transforming  grace  of  God.  Pascal's  contempt 
for  philosophy,  his  pessimistic  outlook  upon  nature  and  man, 
his  exaltation  of  the  will  above  reason,  make  him  a  forerun- 
ner of  Schopenhauer  to  whose  system  of  ethics  we  must  now 
turn. 


1.  Ethic,  pt.  5,  prop.  25,  tr.  W.  H.  White. 

2.  lb.,  prop.  36. 


32  The  Ethical  Ideal  of  Renunciation 

C.    Revival  of  Renunciation  in  the  Nineteenth 
Century. 

As  yet  our  historical  inquiry  has  yielded  no  substantial 
metaphysical  basis  for  our  ethical  ideal  of  renunciation. 
This,  however,  is  the  contribution  of  the  Nineteenth  Century 
to  our  subject.  In  the  systems  of  Taoism  and  Yogaism,  re- 
nunciation received  some  metaphysical  support,  but  it  was 
crude,  naive  and  dogmatic  in  character,  while  in  Buddhism 
and  Christianity,  the  ground  was  predominantly  ethical. 
With  the  rise  of  rationalism,  renunciation  was  placed  on  a 
rational  basis  in  the  Occasionalism  of  Geulincx  and  Male- 
branche. 

The  reign  of  renunciation  in  this  field  was  brief  and  in 
the  strife  which  succeeded  Cartesianism  between  Empiricism 
on  the  one  hand  and  Idealism  on  the  other,  it  practically  dis- 
appeared from  the  philosophical  field,  both  in  the  pre-Kant- 
ian  period  and  in  the  German  Idealism  which  followed  the 
development  of  the  Kantian  principles.  Traces  of  renuncia- 
tion, however,  are  not  lacking  in  the  general  literature  of 
the  earlier  periods  of  the  Nineteenth  Century,  but  they  ap- 
peared in  the  unreasoned  and  impulsive  pessimism  which  was 
common.  Striking  examples  of  renunciation  may  be  found 
in  the  poetry  of  Leopardi  and  A.  de  Lamartine.  In  the 
former  there  is  a  denial  of  the  value  of  human  life  and  an  ur- 
gent counselling  to  despise  self  and  nature,^  while  the  latter 
seeks  Christian  resignation  as  an  anodyne  for  the  pains  and 
ills  of  human  existence.^  Schelling,  also,  in  his  Nachtwachen 
makes  the  life  of  man  but  the  mask  of  nonentity,  only  some- 
thing which  will  be  torn  in  pieces  and  cast  away.^  But  it  is 
not  until  the  system  of  Arthur  Schopenhauer  (1788-1860) 
appeared  that  renunciation  is  thoroughly  revived  and  placed 
on  metaphysical  grounds.  Like  Buddha,  Schopenhauer  con- 
demned human  life  in  toto.  He  could  find  no  such  thing  as 
human  happiness  for  the  evil  in  the  world  far  outweighs  the 

1.  Quoted  by  James  Sully,  "Pessimism,"  pg.  26. 

2.  lb.,  pg.  27. 

3.  lb.,  pg.  28. 


Renunciation  in  Its  Historical  Development         33 

good.  This  world  is  the  worst  possible  of  worlds  because 
if  it  were  slightly  worse  it  could  not  exist  at  all.  Human  life 
is  valueless  and  if  there  appear  to  be  elements  of  value  in 
it,  these  are  over-balanced  by  the  worthless  elements  with 
which  life  abounds.  Non-existence  is,  therefore,  to  be  pre- 
ferred to  existence  and  the  complete  renunciation  of  life  and 
the  world  is  the  only  course  for  man  to  pursue.  To  see 
Schopenhauer's  contribution  to  our  subject,  it  will  be  neces- 
sary to  examine  his  metaphysical  grounds  and  trace  some- 
thing of  the  way  in  which  he  lays  the  foundation  and  pro- 
ceeds to  build  his  ethical  system  with  its  hedonic  pessimism, 
which  ends  in  his  thorough-going  ideal  of  renunciation. 

Starting  with  the  subjective  idealism  of  Kant  and  proceed- 
ing apriori,  Schopenhauer  reduces  the  phenomenal  world  to 
Idea^  and  the  noumenal  world  or  the  *'Ding  an  sich"  to 
Will.-  This  Will,  which  is  the  metaphysical  principle  of  the 
system  and  "The  inmost  nature,  the  kernel  of  every  par- 
ticular thing  and  of  the  whole"  is  in  its  nature  but  a  striving 
impulse,  ever  striving  for  objectification  but  blindly  and  un- 
intelligently.  This  objectification  of  the  Will  appears  in 
every  grade  of  nature  from  the  lowest  blind  force  to  the 
highest  and  most  deliberate  action  of  man.  In  man  this  prin- 
ciple comes  to  self-consciousness  and  knows  itself  as  volition- 
al activity.  The  whole  phenomenal  world  leaps  into  ex- 
istence as  the  mirror  of  the  Will  but  as  we  shall  see  later, 
the  Will  has  over-reached  itself  in  kindling  this  light  of 
knowledge  for  it  develops  the  power  to  react  upon  the  Will 
and  to  bring  about  its  self-surrender.^  The  stimulus  of  this 
activity  of  the  world  principle  is  found  in  want  which  arises 
from  deficiency  and,  therefore,  from  suffering.  Suffering  is 
the  ever  present  companion  of  the  Will  and  the  higher  the 
grade  of  objectification  the  more  intense  the  suffering.  For 
this  reason  the  Genius  would  suffer  most  of  all  men.*  Man 
finds  relief  from  this  suffering  in  Art,  which  serves  to  quiet 

1.  The  World  as  Will  and  Idea,  tr.  Haldane  and  Kemp,  Vol.  I,  bk.  i. 

2.  lb.,  bk.  2. 

3.  lb.,  Vol.  I,  bk.  2,  sees.  24-27. 

4.  lb.,  bk.  3,  sec.  36. 


34  The  Ethical  Ideal  of  Renunciation 

the  striving  of  the  Will.  Art  provides  the  opportunity  for 
contemplation  during  which  man  becomes  a  "Will-less,  pain- 
less and  timeless  subject  of  knowledge."  This  relief,  how- 
ever, is  limited  to  only  a  few  for  contemplation  is  difficult 
to  attain,  and  even  for  these  favored  few  the  relief  is  only 
temporary,  for  the  state  of  contemplation  is  fleeting.  Aesthe- 
tics, thus  failing  to  give  man  any  lasting  satisfaction  or  re- 
lief from  his  suffering  incident  to  the  incessant  striving  of  the 
Will,  Schopenhauer  turns  to  the  ethical  field.^  A  further 
study  of  the  World-Will,  leads  Schopenhauer  to  see  that 
it  is  always  willing  life  and  in  its  essence  is  the  "WILL-TO- 
LIVE."  Now  if  the  essence  of  man  is  the  Will-to-live  and 
he  has  in  his  power  the  control  of  this  metaphysical  principle, 
and  man  has  such  a  power  in  his  intellect,  the  human  problem 
is,  therefore,  the  assertion  or  the  denial  of  the  Will-to-live  '*■ 
Schopenhauer  does  not  hesitate  in  his  course  of  action  but 
proceeds  to  suppress  the  W^ill-to-live.  With  knowledge  as 
either  the  motive  or  the  quieter  of  the  Will,  man  may  well 
ask  what  is  to  be  gained  by  the  assertion  of  the  Will.  Schop- 
enhauer answers  that  only  dissatisfaction  and  suffering  can 
result.  The  Will  has  no  goal  and  is  therefore  susceptible  to 
no  final  satisfaction.  The  striving  goes  on  forever,  restrain- 
ed only  by  hindrances  which  produce  suffering.  There  be- 
ing no  end  of  striving,  there  can  be  no  end  of  suffering.^  In 
the  individual,  there  may  seem  to  be  an  aim  for  the  Will 
which  will  be  the  satisfaction  of  a  want  but  a  posterori,  we 
know  that  if  the  want  is  satisfied,  satiety  is  begotten  and  ennui 
ensues  which  is  only  another  form  of  pain.  The  want  of  lif  * 
is  pain  and  the  satisfaction  of  want  leads  to  pain,  thus  hu- 
man life  "Is  tossed  backwards  and  forwards  between  pain 
and  ennui. "^  Whatever  happiness  there  is  in  life  is  purely 
negative,— only  the  deliverance  from  pain,  and  therefore  at 
the  best,  can  never  be  enduring.^    To  assert  the  Will  is  to 

1.  The  World  as  Will  and  Idea,  Vol.  I,  bk.  3,  sec.  52. 

2.  lb.,  bk.  4,  sec.  54. 

3.  lb.,  bk.  4,  sec.  56. 

4.  lb.,  bk.  4,  sec.  57. 

5.  lb.,  sec.  58. 


Renunciation  in  Its  Historical  Development         35 

continue  this  miserable  existence  in  a  world  which  like  "All 
bad  ware  is  covered  over  by  a  false  lustre.*'  To  escape 
the  badness  and  the  delusion  of  existence,  the  denial  of  the 
Will-to-live  is  the  only  remedy.  This  denial  can  never  take 
the  form  of  suicide  which  is  only  a  very  strong  assertion  of 
the  Will  and  effects  the  particular  manifestation  of  the 
World- Will  only.  Equipped  with  knowledge,  man  sees  suf- 
fering in  the  world  and  feeling  it  in  his  own  life,  he  pierces 
the  veil  of  delusion  which  hangs  over  his  existence  and  delib- 
erately sets  himself,  by  various  practices,  to  deny  the  Will. 
Ultimately  this  means  the  Will-to-live  turning  upon  itself 
and  surrendering  its  existence.  When  this  is  absolutely  and 
completely  done,  all  things  are  abolished  and  there  remain 
''No  Will,  no  idea,  no  world, "^  and  the  renunciation  is  vic- 
torious. Nothing  remains.  This  nothingness  is  the  high- 
est goal  and  by  no  means  should  be  evaded  or  as  Schopen- 
hauer sums  it  up:  "We  must  banish  the  dark  impression  of 
that  nothingness  which  we  discern  behind  all  virtue  and  holi- 
ness as  their  final  goal,  and  which  we  fear  as  children  fear 
the  dark;  we  must  not  even  evade  it  like  the  Indians,  through 
myths  and  meaningless  words,  such  as  re-absorption  in 
Brahma  or  the  Nirvana  of  the  Buddhists.  Rather  do  we 
freely  acknowledge  that  what  remains  after  the  entire  ab- 
solution of  the  Will  is  for  all  those  who  are  still  full  of 
Will,  certainly  nothing;  but,  conversely,  to  those  in  whom  the 
Will  has  turned  and  has  denied  itself,  this  our  world,  which 
is  so  real,  with  all  its  suns  and  milky-ways  is  nothing."^ 
Sharp  is  the  contrast  between  Schopenhauer  and  the  Oc- 
casionalists.  Where  Geulincx  and  Malebranche  left  man 
without  will,  Schopenhauer  made  him  all  will.  For  the 
former,  the  world  must  be  renounced  because  the  will  can 
effect  nothing  and  for  the  latter  renunciation  of  the  world 
is  the  only  escape  from  the  will  which  effects  too  much.  The 
Occasionalists  did  not  advocate  asceticism  nor  chastity  but  for 
Schopenhauer  these  are  useful  instruments  in  subduing  the 

1.  The  World  as  Will  and  Idea,  Vol.  I,  bk.  4,  sec.  71. 

2.  lb.,  sec.  71. 


36  The  Ethical  Ideal  of  Renunciation 

will  and  making  for  the  complete  extinction  of  the  race, 
which  to  him  is  the  greatest  of  blessings. 

Among  the  disciples  of  Schopenhauer,  there  is  a  turning 
away  from  his  extreme  pessimistic  conclusions  with  the  ex- 
ception of  Junius  Bahnsen  (i 830-1 881)  who  went  to  the 
greatest  length,  even  denying  the  consolation  of  Aesthetics 
and  the  possibility  of  the  final  annihilation  of  the  Will-to- 
live.  He  could  find  no  evidence  of  intelligence,  order  or  de- 
sign in  the  universe  and  therefore  any  representation  of  it  in 
Art,  instead  of  bringing  quiet  and  satisfaction  as  Schopen- 
hauer contended,  could  only  produce  disturbances  and  even 
anguish  to  the  logical  mind  of  man.  Having  dispensed  with 
the  intellect,  Bahnsen  destroyed  the  only  instrument  which 
Schopenhauer  possessed  for  the  subduing  of  the  will  and  left 
nothing  but  the  "Will  rending  itself  in  an  eternal  self-parti- 
tion.''  He  concludes  that  all  affirmation  of  life  and  the 
world  is  useless.  "Enough,  so  far  our  senses,  our  search, 
our  thought,  our  speculative  grubbing,  reach,  we  obtain  noth- 
ing but  a  vain  moaning  in  the  world  and  no  prospect  of  re- 
lease."^ 

The  human  mind,  however,  can  not  content  itself  with 
a  view  of  life  entirely  devoid  of  hope  or  consolation.  Even 
Schopenhauer  sought  something  of  consolation  in  his  idea  of 
eternal  justice,  the  exaltation  of  Art  and  the  freedom  from 
the  fear  of  death.  It  is  to  be  expected  that  there  would  be 
disciples  of  Schopenhauer  who  would  seek  to  soften  the  hard 
lines  of  their  Master's  conclusion.  Such  a  disciple  was  Frau- 
enstadt  (18 13-1878)  who  denied  that  the  term  pessimist 
could  be  applied  to  a  cosmical  system  which  asserts  the  de- 
nial of  the  Will-to-live  and  sought  some  consolation  for  the 
Will.  He  distinguishes  between  the  higher  Will  of  man  and 
the  inferior  will  of  the  animal  which  Schopenhauer  had 
identified.^  By  rejecting  the  subjective  idealism  of  his  mas- 
ter, he  is  able  to  find  a  reality  in  human  history  and  an  end 
and  plan  for  the  historical  process.    Thus  he  gave  Will  the 


1.  Sully's  Pessimism,  pg.  107. 

2.  Sully's  Pessimism,  pg.  108. 


Renunciation  in  Its  Historical  Development         37 

element  of  purpose  in  which  resides  the  consolidation  and  of- 
fers a  basis  for  a  sort  of  reconciliation  between  pessimism 
and  optimism. 

But  by  far  the  most  important  follower  of  Schopenhauer 
is  Edward  von  Hartmann  (1842-1906)  who,  while  accept- 
ing the  general  position  of  the  founder  of  the  Pessimistic 
School,  sought  to  escape  his  extreme  conclusions.  Hartmann 
admits  the  misery  of  the  human  existence  and  advocates  the 
denial  of  the  Will-to-live  as  the  only  hope  for  man  but  upon 
a  more  optimistic  basis  than  Schopenhauer.  In  his  "Philoso- 
phy of  the  Unconscious"  he  attempts  to  reconcile  Schopen- 
hauer and  Hegel  by  making  the  Will  unconsciously  intelli- 
gent and  by  so  doing,  approaches  the  optimism  of  Leibnitz. 
Where  Schopenhauer  had  his  Platonic  ideas  to  serve  as 
stages  in  the  evolution  of  the  Will,  Hartmann  makes  the  idea 
the  guide  of  the  Will  as  it  realizes  itself  in  the  world.  By 
the  introduction  of  the  principle  of  intelligence,  Hartmann  is 
able  to  agree  with  Leibnitz  that  this  is  the  best  possible 
world.  He  says:  "If,  in  the  all-wise  Unconscious,  among  all 
possible  representations,  that  of  a  better  world  had  had  a 
place,  this  other  would  certainly  have  been  produced."^ 
However,  since  it  is  the  nature  of  the  Will  to  be  eternally 
unsatisfied  and  all  pleasure  consists  in  such  satisfaction,  this 
world,  while  the  best  possible,  is  only  a  world  of  pain  and 
misery,  to  which  nothingness  is  decidedly  preferable.  Thus 
so  far  as  the  nature  of  the  world  is  concerned,  Hartmann  and 
Schopenhauer  are  in  agreement,  but  where  the  latter  makes 
evil  irreparable,  the  former  by  assuming  an  end  for  the  world, 
makes  evil  reparable.  Again  Hartmann  differs  from  his 
master,  in  the  effect  of  the  denial  of  the  Will.  When  the 
Unconscious  comes  to  consciousness,  the  intellect  is  emanci- 
pated from  the  Will  and  man  becomes  conscious  of  the  na- 
ture of  the  Will  and  the  pain  and  the  misery  which  it  must 
ever  cause  unless  it  is  subdued,  but  where  Schopenhauer 
makes  the  intellect  the  quieter  of  the  Will,  Hartmann  makes 


I.    Philosophy  of  the  Unconscious,  Vol.  Ill,  ch.  xvi,  tr.  W.  C.  Coupland. 


38  The  Ethical  Ideal  of  Renunciation 

the  conscious  denial  of  the  Will  set  up  an  antagonism  within 
the  Will  itself  between  a  willing-to-will  movement  and  a  non- 
willing-to-will  movement.  The  result  of  this  antagonism  is 
that  the  Will  devours  itself  and  returns  to  nothing.  Accord- 
ingly, Hartmann  believes  that  Schopenhauer's  contention  for 
the  denial  of  the  Will-to-live,  is  premature  and  that  instead 
of  the  individual  denying  the  Will,  he  should  affirm  the 
Will-to-live  or  in  other  words,  since  the  end  of  the  world 
is  to  emancipate  the  intellect  from  the  will,  it  becomes  man's 
duty  to  work  in  harmony  with  the  Unconscious  and  help  on 
with  the  world  process.  Hartmann  claims  that  his  optimism 
supplies  an  adequate  basis  for  practical  effort  and  hopeful 
endeavor,  the  end  of  which  is  to  so  further  the  cause  of  in- 
telligence that  the  race  will  be  brought  the  more  quickly  to 
recognize  the  futility  of  willing  and  all  unite  in  one  universal 
aim  to  end  the  misery  of  the  world  by  one  great  act  of  Will- 
denial.^ 

The  influence  of  Schopenhauer's  pessimism  is  not  confined 
to  philosophic  speculation  but  appears  in  certain  artistic  cir- 
cles, especially  in  the  works  of  Richard  Wagner  ( 1813-1883. 
In  his  earlier  thinking,  Wagner  was  under  the  influence  of 
the  Romantic  School  with  its  conception  of  the  joy  of  life, 
the  music  of  which  can  be  heard  in  Lohengrin  and  Tannhaus- 
er.  However,  the  very  pronounced  atmosphere  of  Hegelian 
thought  had  its  effect  upon  Wagner,  especially  the  left  school 
of  Hegelianism  under  the  leadership  of  Feuerbach  (1804- 
72)  who  turned  away  from  the  Hegelian  notion  that  God 
comes  to  consciousness  in  man  and  posited  the  principle  of 
self -consciousness  as  the  Absolute  and  man  the  beginning,  the 
middle  and  the  end  of  all  things.  Under  the  inspiration  of 
this  idea,  Wagner  began  a  work  which  finally  developed  into 
the  Triology  of  the  Nibelung.  It  is  anarchistic  in  char- 
acter and  aims  to  make  Siegfried,  the  superman,  completely 
triumphant  over  Wotan  the  god.  But  before  the  completion 
of  the  Nibelung  Triology,  Wagner  came  under  the  influence 
of  Schopenhauer,  with  his  principle  of  the  Will  of  sorrow  and 
weakness.    Siegfried,  while  vanquishing  the  god,  Wotan,  by 


I.     Philosophy  of  the  Unconscious,  Vol.  Ill,  ch.  xiv. 


Renunciation  in  Its  Historical  Development         39 

breaking  his  spear,  begins  to  weaken  and  the  Triology  ends 
with  the  sublime  renunciation  of  "Rest,  rest  Thee  Oh  God** 
(Ruhe!  Ruhe,  du  Gott.)^  The  influence  of  Schopenhauer 
upon  Wagner  is  seen  more  in  the  latter's  "Tristan  and 
Isolde,"  a  work  of  which  Wagner  said  himself,  in  a  letter  to 
Liszt:  "I  have  in  my  head  'Tristan  and  Isolde'  the  simplest 
and  most  full  blooded  musical  conception :  with  the  black  flag 
that  floats  at  the  end  of  it  I  shall  cover  myself  to  die."  As 
Siegfried  and  Brunhilda  express  the  joy  of  living  and  the 
exaltation  of  the  will,  Tristan  and  Isolde  express  the  misery 
of  life  and  the  negation  of  the  will.  They  praise  the  night  of 
oblivion  and  curse  the  day.^  Personality  is  a  delusion :  "No 
more  Tristan.  .  .  .  no  more  Isolde"  (Nicht  mehr  Tri- 
stan. .  .  .  nicht  mehr  Isolde.)^  Death  is  sought  as 
the  supreme  bliss.  The  highest  joy  is  unconscious  oblivion. 
As  Tristan  takes  the  cup  in  which  he  believes  is  the  deadly 
poison  and  places  its  brim  to  his  lips  he  cries: 

"Vergessen's  giit'ger  Trank, — 
dich  trink  'ich  sonder  Wank  V* 

Thus  Wagner  would  make  the  renunciation  of  life  and  the 
denial  of  the  will  the  highest  joy.  Tristan  also  practises  non- 
resistance  in  refusing  to  defend  himself  against  Melot^  and 
King  Mark  manifests  no  resentment  against  Tristan  but  in 
fact  forgives  him,**  while  the  story  ends  in  the  complete  nega- 
tion of  the  will.  As  Isolde,  in  Buddhistic  fashion  sinks  to  the 
breast  of  the  dead  Tristan,  she  utters  these  renunciatory 
words: 


"In  dem  wogenden  Schwall. 

in  dem  tonenden  Schall, 

in   des   Welt-Athems 

wehendem  All, — 

ertrinken. 

versinken, — 

unbewiisst, — 

hochste  Lustr" 

I. 

Die  Gotterdammerung,  Act  iii. 

2. 

Tristan  and  Isolde,  ed.  by  Henderson,  Act  ii,  sc.  2. 

3- 

lb.,  Act  ii,  sc.  2. 

4- 

lb.,  Act  i,  sc.  6. 

5. 

lb..  Act  iii,  sc.  3. 

6. 

lb.,  Act  iii,  sc.  3. 

7. 

lb..  Act  iii,  sc.  3. 

40  The  Ethical  Ideal  of  Renunciation 

However,  Wagner  does  not  cover  himself  with  the  "Black 
flag"  of  Buddhistic  renunciation  and  Schopenhauerian  pes- 
simism as  delineated  in  "Tristan  and  Isolde"  but  in  the  clos- 
ing years  of  his  life  and  thought  he  turned  from  this  pes- 
simism of  weakness  to  the  Christian  pessimism  of  strength. 
This  he  portrays  in  "Parsifal"  which  is  really  Wagner's 
great  confession  of  faith.  When  he  wrote  a  friend  near  the 
end  of  his  life  these  words:  "Can  you  conceive  of  a  moral 
duty  without  some  form  of  renunciation"  he  had  accepted 
the  Christian  point  of  view  and  spoke  of  renunciation  in  the 
Christian  sense. 

Like  Wagner,  Hienrik  Ibsen  (182 8- 1906)  did  not  so 
much  argue  the  principle  of  renunciation  as  he  portrayed  it. 
He,  too,  had  his  romantic  period  from  which  he  turned  to 
the  realistic.  It  is  in  this  period  when  renunciation  makes  its 
appearance.  In  "Brand"  Ibsen  follows  to  its  logical  con- 
clusion, the  morality  of  Rigorism  with  its  cry:  "All  or 
none."^  Here  the  self  is  nothing,  life  is  nothing  but  duty  is 
everything;  all  of  which  ends  in  such  a  severe  form  of  re- 
nunciation that  it  reacts  upon  itself  for  its  own  destruction.^ 
In  "Peer  Gynt"  self-realization  is  the  all  but  like  the  severe 
renunciation  of  Brand,  the  "Barrel  of  self"^  in  which  Peer 
Gynt  lived,  lead  him  at  last  to  the  Button  Moulder  and  his 
own  undoing.  Since  the  empire  of  the  spirit  as  in  "Brand" 
and  the  empire  of  the  flesh,  as  in  "Peer  Gynt"  have  neither 
succeeded,  Ibsen  combines  the  two  in  "Emperor  and  Galil- 
lean"  with  the  intention  of  creating  a  third  empire,  "An 
empire  of  Man  asserting  the  eternal  validity  of  his  own 
will."*  But  in  the  conflict  between  the  empire  of  the  spirit, 
represented  by  Christianity  and  the  empire  of  the  flesh,  repre- 
sented by  Julian,  Ibsen  is  unable  to  secure  a  victory  for  his 
third  empire  and  on  the  plains  of  Persia,  his  empire  of 
flesh  succumbs  to  the  empire  of  the  spirit  in  the  dying  cry  of 


1.  Brand.  Act  ii. 

2.  lb.,  Act  iii. 

3.  Peer  Gynt,  Act  iv,  sc.  13. 

4.  Bernard  Shaw,  Quintessence  of  Ibsenism,  pg.  56. 


Renunciation  in  Its  Historical  Development         41 

Julian:  "Thou  hast  conquered,  GaHlean.''^  Thus  the  will 
surrenders  to  the  intellect,  the  flesh  to  the  spirit  and  the  third 
empire  fails  of  realization.  Maximus  standing  over  the  dead 
Julian  can  only  say:  "What  is  it  worth  to  live?  All  is  sport 
and  mockery, — to  will  is  to  have  to  will."^  In  "Rosmersholm" 
Ibsen's  philosophy  of  religion  with  its  renunciatory  element 
is  well  illustrated.  The  individualist,  radical  and  free-think- 
er, Rebecca,  invades  the  rigorist  Rosmer  home  and  seeks  to 
win  the  country  parson  to  her  ideals.  To  accomplish  her 
purpose  she  does  not  hesitate  to  plot  the  destruction  of  Ros- 
mer's  wife  who  is  finally  driven  to  commit  suicide.  However, 
before  Rebecca  goes  the  whole  way  with  her  plans,  she  re- 
pents, confesses  the  crime  of  causing  the  death  of  Mrs. 
Rosmer,  thus  renouncing  her  egoistic  ideals  and  accepting  the 
"Rosmer  view  of  life."^  The  story  ends  with  Rosmer  and 
Rebecca  expiating  the  wrongs  of  their  lives  by  sacrificing 
themselves  in  the  same  millstream  in  which  Mrs.  Rosmer 
had  cast  herself.  It  is  quite  evident  that  while  Ibsen  is  a 
strong  individualist,  he  never  loses  the  sense  of  moral  re- 
sponsibility and  this  weighs  upon  him  so  heavily  that  he  is 
regoristic  and  therefore  unable  to  escape  the  element  of  re- 
nunciation. 

In  the  literature  of  Russia,  especially  that  of  Tolstoi  and 
Dostoieffsky,  the  misery  and  sorrow  of  life  are  so  keenly 
felt  that  renunciation  takes  root  easily.  In  his  earlier  life 
Tolstoi  was  a  realist.  Turning  from  the  teachings  of  the 
Church  in  which  he  had  been  brought  up,  he  gave  himself  to 
the  world  of  sense.  Dissatisfaction  overtaking  him,  he  be- 
gan to  feel  the  emptiness  of  the  world  as  he  saw  it.  Find- 
ing no  peace  of  mind,  he  became  an  ardent  student  of  the 
teachings  of  Jesus,  especially  the  Sermon  on  the  Mount.  He 
became  convinced  that  he  had  discovered  the  fundamental 
principle  of  these  teachings  and  of  the  whole  system  of  Chris- 
tianity In  Matthew  5:38,  39:  "Ye  have  heard  that  it  hath 


1.  Emperor  and  Galilean,  Act  v,  sc.  4. 

2.  Emperor  and  Galilean,  Act  v,  sc.  4. 

3.  Rosmersholm,  Act  v. 


42  The  Ethical  Ideal  of  Renunciation 

been  said,  an  eye  for  an  eye  and  a  tooth  for  a  tooth :  But  I 
say  unto  you,  that  ye  resist  not  evil."  This  Tolstoi  inter- 
preted as  meaning:  '^Whatever  injury  the  evil  disposed  may 
inflict  upon  you,  bear  it,  give  all  that  you  have,  but  resist 
not."^  Non-resistance  became  the  real  principle  of  all  Tol- 
stoi's teaching.  He  not  only  taught  this  form  of  renunciatioa 
but  practiced  it.  He  passed  through,  on  account  of  it,  a  pro- 
found spiritual  experience.  He  repudiated  his  former  course 
of  life  and  sought  to  renounce  the  world  of  sense.  He  agrees 
with  Schopenhauer  in  doing  away  with  all  self-love  but  is 
entirely  out  of  sympathy  with  his  conclusions  in  respect  to  the 
human  race.  Where  Schopenhauer  seeks  to  extinguish  the 
race,  Tolstoi  would  have  it  continue  its  existence  and  serve 
God  through  the  non-resentment  of  evil  and  the  activity  of 
love. 

Dostoieflsky  portrays  renunciation  in  the  career  of  Ras- 
kolnikoff,  the  leading  character  in  ''Crime  and  Punishment," 
who  reaches  a  point  where  he  must  do  something  or  renounce 
his  life  or  as  he  says:  "Renounce  life  altogether  and  obedient- 
ly submit  to  fate  as  it  is,  stifle  everything  and  dismiss  the  right 
to  act,  live  and  love."^  He  discarded  the  thought  of  renun- 
ciation and  under  the  spell  of  the  self-assertive  Napoleon,  he 
proceeded  to  commit  a  double  murder  and  then  justified  it  by 
his  philosophy  of  self-assertion.  According  to  his  line  of 
reasoning,  men  are  divided  into  ordinary  and  extraordinary 
men.  The  former  live,  from  their  very  nature,  in  a  state  of 
obedience  and  have  no  right  to  break  the  law ;  while  the  lat- 
ter, from  the  sheer  force  of  their  individuality,  are  permitted 
to  overstep  all  bounds  so  far  as  the  realization  of  their  own 
ideas  require.  For  such  men  there  can  be  the  repudiation  of 
all  law:  "Men  for  whom,  to  a  certain  extent,  laws  do  not 
exist."  This  division  rests  upon  nature  which  separates  men 
into  these  two  catagories  and  the  morality  of  the  ordinary 
man  is  inferior  and  that  of  the  extraordinary  man  is  super- 
ior.^   But  a  doubt  begins  to  take  shape  in  the  mind  of  Ras- 


1.  My  Religion,  ch.  i. 

2.  Crime  and  Punishment,  ch.  iv. 

3.  lb.,  ch.  V. 


Renunciation  in  Its  Historical  Development         43 

kolnikofif  that  he  may  not  belong  to  the  superior  class,  a 
doubt  which,  under  the  compunctions  of  conscience,  finally 
sweeps  the  ground  from  under  his  major  morality  and  at  the 
suggestion  of  Sonia,  he  confesses  his  crime  and  willingly  goes 
to  Siberia.  Here  is  a  complete  break-down  of  the  ideal  of 
self-realization  and  a  definite  repentance  and  repudiation  of 
the  self.  Dostoleffsky  leaves  Raskolnikoff  seeking  Christian 
regeneration.^ 

While  the  19th  Century  thus  witnessed  a  pronounced  re- 
vival of  renunciation,  it  is  also  true  that  this  Century  pro- 
duced the  most  violent  opposition  to  the  idea.  This  op- 
position centered  principally  in  two  egoistic  thinkers,  Nietz- 
sche and  Sudermann.  With  the  former  self-realization 
through  disobedience  is  posited  over  against  renunciation, 
while  with  the  latter,  it  is  self-realization  both  in  joys  and 
sins.  Both  thinkers  agree  in  repudiating  renunciation  in 
every  form  and  in  setting  up  in  opposition  a  thorough-going 
egoism.  Wagner  and  Ibsen  did  the  same  in  the  earlier 
periods  of  their  thinking  but  both  return  from  the  revolt  to  a 
religious  basis,  but  not  so  with  Nietzsche  and  Sudermann,— 
they  never  return.  W^Ith  Sudermann,  the  opposition  to  re- 
nunciation is  found  in  his  portrayal  of  an  individualism  which 
brooks  no  denial  of  self  in  any  form.  His  heroes  are  not 
so  much  immoral  as  unmoral.  They  repudiate  the  law  rath- 
er than  disobey  It.  They  revolt  against  all  social  standards 
and  know  nothing  of  repentance  or  confession  of  wrong  do- 
ing. Paul,  in  ''Dame  Care"  finds  his  Individuality  in  commit- 
ting arson  and  when  he  confesses  his  crime  in  the  law  court, 
there  Is  no  sense  of  sin  but  rather  the  sense  of  joy  for  he  says, 
speaking  of  his  crime,  '*This  deed  has  given  me  happiness.'* 
In  "Magda"  the  Protagorean  view  is  taken  that  "Man  is 
the  measure  of  all  things."  Magda  does  as  she  pleases  in 
the  world,  a  world,  which  to  her,  has  no  law.  She  says  to 
her  father,  when  he  asks  concerning  what  she  considers  to 
be  true:  'True  to  myself,"     "I  am  what  I  am,"  "I  do  what 


I.     Crime  and  Punishment,  Epilogue  ch.  ii. 


44  The  Ethical  Ideal  of  Renunciation 

I  do."  To  her  pastor,  she  declares  that  to  be  happy,  you 
must  sin  and  be  greater  than  your  sin.  In  "The  Cat's 
Bridge"  Regina  has  really  no  sense  of  right  or  wrong,  while 
Beata  in  the  "Joy  of  living"  cries  out  in  her  individualism 
"Must  every  instinct  end  in  remorse?"  Sudermann's  attack 
upon  the  rigoristic  ideal  of  renunciation  is  intended  to  make 
it  appear  that  such  an  ideal  is  misleading  and  unnecessary  and 
he  does  this  by  setting  up  his  uncompromising  ideal  of  in- 
dividualism that  it  may  make  its  own  appeal.  This  opposi- 
tion of  Sudermann,  is  very  mild  as  compared  with  the  open 
and  bitter  attack  of  Nietzsche  upon  all  depreciatory  ideals 
of  human  life.  Like  Schopenhauer,  he  made  the  will  the 
very  essence  of  man  but  where  Schopenhauer  conceived  of 
this  essence  as  the  Will-to-live  and  human  happiness  to  con- 
sist in  over-coming  it,  Nietzsche  developed  the  notion  of  the 
Will-to-power  and  made  human  happiness  to  consist  in  the 
very  exercise  of  this  power  and  in  "The  feeling  that  power 
increases."  For  this  reason,  Nietzsche  was  at  bitter  war 
with  everything  which  found  any  weakness  or  evil  in  the  will. 
He  hated  science  and  religion  because  he  believed  that  the 
former  belittled  man  and  the  latter  treated  him  as  though 
he  were  sick  and  placed  God  over  him.  Nietzsche  argued 
that  all  moral  standards  are  man-made  and  must  be  con- 
stantly changing.  Anything  which  tends  to  fix  a  standard  of 
morality  is  an  enemy  of  man  because  such  a  standard  hinders 
the  free  action  of  his  natural  instincts  and  powers.  By  the 
means  of  will  man  must  rise  above  all  ethical  standards,  even 
above  the  conception  of  good  and  evil.  By  the  will  man  may 
become  the  superman.  Nietzsche  is  an  immoralist,  material- 
ist and  empiricist.  The  superman,  which  he  never  really  por- 
trays, is  the  goal  of  the  earth.  "Man  is  a  bridge  connecting 
ape  and  superman.  .  .  .  The  superman  will  be  the  final 
flower  and  ultimate  expression  of  the  earth. "^  With  such  a 
goal  conceived  for  humanity,  Nietzsche  sweeps  away  every- 
thing which  tends  to  give  man  a  depressing  view  of  himself. 
He  must  "Be  hard"  to  all  want,  pain  or  misery  in  the  world, 

I.    Also  Sprach  Zarathustra,  I. 


Renunciation  in  Its  Historical  Development         45 

absolutely  devoid  of  all  pity  or  sympathy.  As  is  to  be  ex- 
pected every  idea  which  has  the  appearance  of  renunciation 
draws  the  fire  of  this  immoralist.  The  despectio  sui  of 
Geulincx,  the  return  of  Wagner  to  the  religious  position,  the 
Christian  view  of  life, — all  are  sharply  denounced  and  often 
with  but  little  critical  estimation.  The  Third  Essay  in  the 
Genealogy  of  Morals  is  given  over  to  the  discussion  of  the 
question  "What  do  ascetic  ideals  mean?"  Nietzsche  answers 
that  for  Schopenhauer  the  ascetic  ideal  means  "To  get  rid  of 
torture,"^  by  which  he  means,  that  for  the  philosopher  or  the 
educated  classes,  the  ascetic  ideal  is  a  form  of  self-assertion 
by  which  independence  is  secured.^  But  having  permitted 
the  philosopher  to  have  a  "Hard  and  cheerful  will  to  renun- 
ciation," he  proceeds  to  show  that  all  others  who  practice  or 
advocate  renunciation  are  "Sickmakers"  who  treat  life  as  a 
wrong  way  which  we  had  best  retrace  or  an  error  which 
should  be  disproved  by  our  deeds.  Such  an  ascetic  ideal, 
Nietzsche  considers  a  self-contradiction  in  that  it  is  the  Will- 
to-power  lording  over  life  itself  and  "Is  prompted  by  the 
self-protective  and  self-preservative  instinct  of  degenerating 
life."^  In  other  words,  the  ascetic  ideal  is  the  means  by 
which  the  instinct  of  self-preservation  attempts  to  counteract 
the  effect  of  some  partial  physiological  stagnation.  Nietzsche 
thus  seeks  a  physical  explanation  of  this  ideal  and  makes  its 
priest  but  the  victim  of  delusion,  the  product  of  the  Will-to- 
power,  operating  in  the  realm  of  human  sickness  and  weak- 
ness. Renunciation  is,  therefore,  only  a  hypnotic  means  of 
getting  rid  of  a  physiological  depression.  Self-contempt  is 
only  an  attack  of  bad  conscience  or  to  sum  it  up  "The  ascetic 
ideal  in  the  service  of  an  extravagance  of  feelings."^  Espec- 
ially does  Nietzsche  pour  out  his  contempt  and  wrath  upon 
Christianity  which  he  believes  places  a  premium  upon  weak- 
ness and  has  brought  about  a  transvaluation  of  all  values  in 
that  it  has  placed  the  weak  in  the  ascendency  and  fostered 

1.  Genealogy  of  Morals,  Tr.  W.  A.  Haussmann,  Third  Essay,  sec.  6. 

2.  lb.,  Third  Essay,  sees,  7,  8. 

3.  lb.,  Third  Essay,  sec.   13. 

4.  lb.,  sec.  20. 


46  The  Ethical  Ideal  of  Renunciation 

slave-morality.  The  ascetic  ideal  for  Nietzsche  is  only  a  dis- 
ease of  the  common  herd  of  mankind.  It  stands  in  the  way 
of  the  few  strong  men, — the  "Lucky  cases  of  man,"  who 
have  the  healthy  Will-to-power,  as  a  dangerous  source  of  con- 
tamination. But  why  does  man  will  nothing?  Nietzsche 
answers  this  question  by  declaring  that  such  is  the  nature  of 
the  Will-to-power  that  even  if  man  be  deluded  with  the  idea 
of  life  as  a  horror,  something  to  be  willed  away,  yet  "Rather 
would  man  will  the  Nothing,  than  not  will.''^  This  bitter 
attack  of  Nietzsche  upon  all  ascetic  ideals  serves,  at  least, 
to  emphasize  the  very  important  part  which  renunciation  has 
played  in  the  life  of  mankind.  For  this  reason,  Nietzsche 
is  of  particular  value  in  this  historical  survey.  While  he 
fails  to  make  out  a  good  case  for  immoralistic  individualism, 
in  that  he  is  the  victim  of  the  weakness  of  all  subjectivism 
and  is  unable  to  satisfactorily  substantiate  his  theory  of  the 
rise  of  morality,  yet  he  serves  us  well  in  being  the  connecting 
link  between  our  historical  investigation  of  the  renunciatory 
ideal  and  its  critical  estimate. 

III.     RENUNCIATION  AS  AN  ETHICAL  IDEAL. 

Our  historical  review  of  renunciation  as  an  ethical  ideal  is 
now  sufficient  to  indicate  something  of  its  universality  and 
persistency  in  human  life,  the  forms  in  which  it  appears  and 
the  ends  which  it  seeks.  Nietzsche  was  appalled  by  the  extent 
and  endurance  of  renunciation.  He  went  so  far  as  to  say 
that  an  observer  from  another  planet  could  "Infer  that  our 
earth  is  the  essentially  ascetic  star."^  In  the  same  connection 
he  notes:  "How  regularly,  how  universally,  how  almost  at 
any  period,  the  ascetic  priest  makes  his  appearance ;  he  does 
not  belong  exclusively  to  any  race;  he  flourishes  anywhere; 
he  grows  out  of  all  classes."^  This  observation  of  Nietzsche 
is  scarcely  exaggerated.  We  have  already  seen  the  great  fas- 
cination of  renunciation  for  the  oriental  mind,  especially  in 
China  and  India.    While  its  domination  is  not  so  marked  in 


1.  Gen.  Morals,  sec.  28. 

2.  lb.,  pt.  III.,  sec.  II. 

3.  lb.,  Third  Essay,  sec.  28. 


Critical  Estimate  of  Renunciation  47 

the  Occident  with  its  ideals  of  life  and  activity,  nevertheless 
it  is  a  fundamental  principle  of  Christianity,  producing  mo- 
nasticism  and  mysticism.  Even  rationalism  did  not  escape  its 
influence  as  is  seen  in  the  teachings  of  Geulincx  and  Male- 
branche.  It  becomes  the  great  weapon  of  the  pessimism  of 
Schopenhauer  and  his  school.  It  introduces  the  melancholy 
note  into  the  music  of  Richard  Wagner,  so  pro- 
nounced in  "Tristan  and  Isolde"  and  "Parsifal."  It 
accompanies  the  sympathism  of  Russian  thought,  par- 
ticularly attractive  for  Tolstoi  and  Dostoieffsky.  These 
are  only  the  principle  fields  in  which  it  appears  for 
scarcely  any  phase  of  human  life  is  free  from  its 
presence  in  some  form,  either  to  be  accepted  or  dismissed. 
In  form,  too,  it  greatly  varies.  For  the  Taoist  it  takes  the 
form  of  nihilism,  nothing  exists,  therefore  nothing  needs  to 
be  done.  For  the  Brahman  it  is  a  worklessness  where- 
in all  motive  and  purpose  disappear  from  activity.  For  the 
Buddhist  and  Schopenhauer  it  Is  life  turning  upon  itself  be- 
cause non-existence  is  to  be  preferred  to  existence.  In  all 
these  forms,  the  end  of  renunciation  is  the  complete  extinc- 
tion of  the  Individual  human  being  because  he  Is  a  stranger 
in  the  world,  without  a  home  and  without  a  work.  For  Geu- 
lincx and  the  Occasionallsts,  the  form  is  that  of  a  rationalistic 
withdrawal  from  nature  because  man  has  no  work  to  per- 
form. He  has  no  will  to  effect  anything,  and  Is  but  a  specta- 
tor in  his  world  with  the  ethical  vocation  of  loving  God  and 
reason.  For  Christianity  and  the  Russian  Sympathists,  the 
form  is  rather  self-denial  with  the  purpose  of  building  up  a 
spiritual  existence  upon  the  ruins  of  self-love  and  self-en- 
deavor. This  form  admits  that  man  has  a  home  in  the  world 
and  a  work  to  accomplish  but  both  home  and  work  are  of  an 
unearthly  character. 

Now  how  shall  we  explain  the  existence  of  this  ideal,  so 
universal,  so  varied  in  form  and  for  the  most  part  so  in- 
imical to  human  existence  in  the  world?  Nietzsche  offers  a 
physiological  explanation  which  we  can  not  accept.  Here 
is  a  power  holding  sway  over  great  masses  of  mankind,  often 
bringing  to  them  a  form  of  satisfaction  and  inspiring  them 


48  The  Ethical  Ideal  of  Renunciation 

to  lofty  deeds.  Man  has  proven  himself  as  capable  of  deny- 
ing himself  as  of  affirming  himself.  To  say  with  Nietzsche 
that  ascetic  ideals  are  due  to  the  effort  of  the  self-preserving 
instinct  to  overcome  some  ''partial  physiological  stagnation 
and  languishment,"^  is  to  underestimate  the  strength  and 
value  of  these  ideals  and  to  offer  a  puerile  explanation.  We 
must  look  for  more  adequate  grounds  for  the  renunciatory 
ideals  and  we  discover  these  in  fields  both  negative  and  posi- 
tive. According  to  the  former,  life  neither  contains  nor  con- 
tents man  and  on  the  latter  basis  the  ideal  of  renunciation 
is  a  means  by  which  man  can  affirm  his  higher  nature  and 
assert  his  essential  superiority  to  the  world  of  sense  and 
immediacy. 

I.  It  is  Nietzsche  who  calls  our  attention  to  the  "Lack" 
element^  in  the  consciousness  of  humanity  and  thus  renders 
us  a  service  in  suggesting  the  question  so  fundamental  in  our 
problem,  viz.  why  is  man,  the  seeming  child  of  nature,  so  dis- 
satisfied and  discontented  with  his  natural  life  in  the  world? 
That  such  is  the  fact  is  revealed  by  his  logic  by  which  he  seeks 
to  recreate  his  world  from  sense  impressions;  by  his  aesthe- 
tics by  which  he  desires  to  improve  upon  nature  and  in  so 
doing  give  play  to  an  inner  impulse  which  goes  out  beyond 
nature;  by  his  ethics  wherein  he  is  continually  adjusting  and 
re-adjusting  himself  with  humanity  and  by  his  religion 
wherein  he  conceives  of  God  and  is  ever  after  unable  to  be- 
lieve that  nature  can  contain  or  content  him  or  satisfy  his 
ideals.  Again  we  must  make  Nietzsche  an  unwilling  con- 
tributor to  our  negative  position  because  he  points  out  that 
man  has  "Suffered  from  the  problem  of  his  significance,"'^ 
but  we  part  company  with  him  as  to  the  meaning  of  this  sig- 
nificance. Nietzsche,  keeping  man  wholly  ensconced  in  nature, 
makes  this  significance  to  reside  wholly  in  the  will,  a  char- 
acteristic of  which  he  says,  is  to  will  something  even  if  it  be 
nothingness.*     We  take  the  position,  however,  that  man  is. 


1.  Gen.  Morals,  pt.  Ill,  sec.  13. 

2.  lb.,  sec.  28. 

3.  lb.,  pt.  Ill,  sec.  28. 

4.  lb. 


Critical  Estimate  of  Renunciation  49 

both  nature  and  spirit,  deriving  from  the  former  his  will  and 
from  the  latter  his  ideals.     It  is  in  the  realm  of  the  spirit 
where  his  real  significance  lies.    While  man  is  a  child  of  na- 
ture in  the  realm  of  sense,  he  is  a  child  of  the  spirit  in  his  in- 
ner life  and  it  is  for  this  reason  that  nature  can  never  con- 
tain nor  content  him.     The  introduction  of  this  spiritual 
conception,  places  man  at  once  in  an  ambiguous  position. 
He  is  not  at  home  in  nature  nor  yet  fully  cognizant  of  his 
place  in  the  spiritual  order.      "Man's  midway  position  as 
well  as  the  mixture  of  sense  and  spirit  in  his  consciousness 
make  it  needful  for  him  to  inquire  concerning  his  place  in 
the  world-whole  and  to  posit  his  inner  life  in  contrast  to 
his  outer  existence."^    It  is  this  conception  of  man's  rela- 
tion   to     a     higher    order    which     lead     Schiller    to     see 
the  "Grace  and  Dignity"   in  humanity  and  while  not  over- 
looking the  intolerable  condition  of  the  human  lot,  believed 
that  man  by  discovering  his  true  nature  and  seeking  to  realize 
it,  could  rise  above  nature  and  attain  to  a  good,  in  compari- 
son with  which  the  world  of  immediacy  dwindles  into  noth- 
ingness.-    That  our  problem  of  renunciation  is  due  to  this 
characteristic  of  humanity  is  born  out  by  the  history  of  re- 
nunciatory ideals.     Why  will  man  turn  upon  his  world  as  in 
Taoism  and  the  Vedanta  and  willingly  negate  it?    The  an- 
swer lies  in  the  fact  that  the  inner  life  is  unsatisfied,  hungry 
and  empty  but  has  not  realized  its  place  in  the  real  world-or- 
der or  even  its  relation  thereto.    Why  will  man  turn  upon  his 
own  life  as  in  Buddhism,  unless  it  be  that  it  appears  value- 
less?    Why  do  Geulincx  and  Malebranche  see  no  work  for 
man  to  do,  unless  it  be  that  he  lacks  something  to  make  his 
life  effective?     Why  will  Schopenhauer  and  his  school  see 
nothing  but  hopeless  despair  for  miserable  humanity,  unless 
it  be  that  there  is  the  failure  to  see  anything  but  want?  Why 
this  everlasting  return  of  Ibsen,  Wagner,  Tolstoi  and  Dos- 
toievsky  from   reahsm,   individualism   and  materialism,   to 


1.  Shaw,  The  Vahie  and  Dignity  of  Human  Life,  pt.  I,  sec.  i. 

2.  Eucken,  Prob.  Human  Life,  Tr.  W.  S.  Hough  and  W.  R.  Gibson, 
pg.  476. 


50  The  Ethical  Ideal  of  Renunciation 

their  repudiation  and  the  positing  of  something  of  a  religious 
character,  unless  it  be  that  the  spiritual  life  is  demanding 
recognition  which  man,  from  his  very  constitution,  is  willing 
to  give  sooner  or  later.  Negatively,  therefore,  nature  can 
never  content  nor  contain  man.  The  problem  which  emerges 
is  that  of  attaining  spiritual  self-hood  in  a  world  of  sense  and 
immediacy.  Renunciation  has  a  service  to  render  in  the 
solution  of  this  problem.  While  it  has  been  frequently  mis- 
used where  all  life  and  work,  as  such,  have  been  repudiated, 
yet  the  nature  of  the  problem  demands  the  proper  use  of  this 
subtle  art  of  repudiation.  It  is  in  the  positive  field  of  the 
affirmation  of  the  self  in  its  spiritual  nature  and  in  its  rela- 
tion to  a  new  order  of  life,  where  renunciation  comes  to  its 
own  rights  and  proves  itself  a  necessary  and  important  fac- 
tor. 

2.  Corresponding  to  the  "Lack"  element,  observed  by 
Nietzsche,  which  places  man  in  the  negative  relation  with 
nature,  there  is  the  "More"  element  observed  by  Schiller  and 
Eucken.  If  nature  can  not  contain  or  content  man,  it  is  be- 
cause man  is  more  than  nature.  Schiller  found  this  "More" 
element  in  the  realm  of  Aesthetics  while  Eucken  sees  it  in 
the  spheres  of  logic,  morality  and  self-consciousness.^  Na- 
ture being  unable  to  account  for  this  sense  of  the  "More" 
without  involving  itself  in  dire  contradictions,  leaves  it  to  be 
grounded  in  the  ego  of  a  spiritual  character.  The  rise  of 
this  spiritual  life  is  not  constant.  As  Eucken  observes,  his- 
tory indicates  that  there  are  periods  of  affirmation  when  the 
consciousness  of  the  spiritual  prevails  and  then  periods  of 
negation  when  the  consciousness  of  nature  and  immediacy 
holds  sway.2  This  can  be  accounted  for  on  the  ground  that 
there  is  no  sharp  line  between  the  world  of  spirit  and  sense 
in  man.  However,  the  spiritual  will  not  down  and  in  its 
struggle  for  realization  and  affirmation  it  uses  renunciation 
to  subdue  the  world  of  sense.  That  man  actually  follows 
such  a  course  of  precedure  is  confined  by  experience  and  his- 


1.  Eucken,  Life's  Basis  and  Life's  Ideals,  Tr.  A.  G.  Widgery,  pg.  ii3ff. 

2.  Eucken,  Life  of  the  Spirit,  Tr.  F.  L.  Pogson,  pg.  103. 


Critical  Estimate  of  Renunciation  51 

tory.  Man  refuses  to  receive  the  world  in  a  passive  or 
uncritical  spirit,  thus  indicating  his  superiority  over  it  and 
manifesting  the  dignity  and  validity  of  his  inner  life.  The 
nihilism  of  the  Tao  may  be  unreasonable  and  repulsive,  yet 
we  are  compelled  to  admit  that  it  illustrates  the  naive  strug- 
gles of  the  ego  to  examine  and  estimate  its  world  and  find- 
ing it  empty  and  being  unable  to  discover  a  positive  order, 
it  turns  and  reduces  its  world  to  nothingness.  We  can  not 
ignore  this  power  of  the  self  to  affirm  something  even  if  that 
something  be  nothing.  This  struggle  with  the  sense-world 
underlies  the  worklessness  of  the  Yoga  and  the  Nirvanism 
of  Buddhism,  for  with  all  the  weak  pessimism  of  these  sys- 
tems, the  Yoga  dedicates  the  self  to  Brahman  in  one  supreme 
deed,  while  Buddhism  would  save  the  self  by  the  **Eight- 
fold  path."  Geulincx,  while  advocating  the  "Despectio  sui/* 
retains  the  dignity  of  being  a  spectator  in  the  world.  Schop- 
enhauer relates  the  self  to  the  world-will  and  thus  gives  it  the 
distinction  of  intellectual  victory  over  the  Will-to-live.  The 
self  can  even  affirm  itself  by  slaying  itself.  Ibsen  has  the 
Button-moulder  say  to  Peer  Gynt:  "To  be  one's  self  is  to 
slay  one's  self."^  Christianity  announces  the  same  principle 
when  it  declares:  "Whosoever  shall  lose  his  life  shall  pre- 
serve it."  Renunciation  is  in  reality  self-affirmation.  By  the 
very  act  of  renouncing,  the  ego  proclaims  its  dignity  and 
superiority  and  enters  into  the  realization  of  its  own  self- 
hood. As  Descartes  realized  his  ontological  self  in  the  dic- 
tum **Cogito,  ergo  sum,^^  man  can  realize  his  ethical  self  by 
declaring;  "I  can  renounce  the  sense  world,  therefore,  I  am 
beyond  it." 

However,  it  is  not  enough  to  merely  renounce  even  if  such 
an  act  provides  the  consciousness  of  inner  integrity  and  dig- 
nity. The  world  of  sense  can  not  be  so  handled.  That  it 
has  something  of  value  is  the  testimony  of  all  culture  and 
civilization.  It  is  only  on  the  basis  that  this  sense-world 
lies  on  a  lower  plain  and  when  it  is  renounced  it  is  in  favor 
of  something  higher,  that  renunciation  becomes  a  valid  and 

I.     Peer  Gynt,  Act  v,  sc.  ix. 


52  The  Ethical  Ideal  of  Renunciation 

worthy  ideal.  It  was  such  a  conception  of  the  idea  which 
appealed  to  Goethe  and  enabled  renunciation  to  secure  his 
favor.  He  turned  away  from  Christianity  largely  because 
of  its  negative  attitude  toward  the  world,  but  he  believed  in 
renunciation  in  the  sense  that  man  must  renew  his  life  by 
"Renouncing  particular  things  at  each  moment,  if  he  can 
grasp  something  new  in  the  next."^ 

Under  the  influence  of  Spinoza,  Goethe  said:  "Renuncia- 
tion once  for  all  in  view  of  the  eternal"  and  in  this  conception 
he  found  an  "Atmosphere  of  peace  breathe  upon  him."^  It 
is  in  some  such  positive  fashion  that  renunciation  renders  its 
service.  Nature  can  not  be  dismissed  as  thoroughly  bad. 
That  there  is  good  in  it  the  mass  of  mankind  insists  on  believ- 
ing. Pessimism  exists  but  it  does  not  flourish  long  nor  well. 
"No  matter  how  convincing  the  arguments  for  renunciation 
may  appear  to  be,  no  matter  how  complete  the  reasoning  oi 
pessimism,  life  must  be  a  benefit,  and  he  who  concludes 
against  it  and  seeks  to  negate  it  must  admit  that  it  possesses 
value  if  only  as  an  opportunity  for  the  denial  on  the  part 
of  man."^  It  is  only  when  renunciation  is  viewed  as  a  path- 
way to  spiritual  life  and  as  an  act  of  self-affirmation  in  the 
process  of  self-realization,  that  it  finds  its  true  place  and  be- 
comes a  valid  ideal  for  life.  Humanity,  in  the  long  run, 
turns  from  absolute  renunciation  of  all  life  as  advocated  by 
the  Buddhists  and  Schopenhauer.  Man  is  too  much  a  part 
of  nature  to  believe  that  it  is  in  no  sense  his  home.  Whilo 
Geulincx  will  admit  that  man  has  a  home  in  the  world  but 
denies  a  work  for  him,  he  is  unable  to  escape  the  snares  of 
Occasionalism  and  the  individual  is  lost  in  the  pantheism  of 
Spinoza  who  follows  Occasionalism  to  its  logical  conclusions. 
Neither  the  Metaphysical  position  of  Schopenhauer  which 
makes  man  all  will,  nor  that  of  Geulincx  which  destroys  all 
will,  can  be  a  satisfactory  basis  for  the  renunciatory  ideal. 
That  it  must  have  such  a  basis  is  true,  but  that  of  Schopen- 

1.  Dichtung  und  Wahrheit,  quoted  by  Edward  Caird,  Literature  and 
Philosophy,  Vol.  I,  pg.  8i. 

2.  Caird,  Essays  on  Literature  and  Philosophy,  Vol.  i,  pg.  8i. 

3.  Shaw,  Value  and  Dignity  of  Human  Life,  pt.  II,  sec.  6. 


Critical  Estimate  of  Renunciation  53 

hauer  is  too  abstract  and  subjective,  while  that  of  Geulincx 
tends  to  pantheism  and  the  loss  of  human  freedom.  Rather 
must  renunciation  be  grounded  In  the  spiritual  dignity  of 
man  as  a  necessity  for  the  subduing  of  the  sense-world  in 
favor  of  the  spiritual  life.  The  world  of  sense  need  not  lose 
its  value  nor  be  repudiated,  as  such,  but  it  must  bow  In  sub- 
mission to  the  real  and  higher  order  which  can  provide  for 
humanity  its  own  sense  of  Immediacy  and  a  genuine  world- 
hood.  Such  a  grounding  of  renunciation  Is  best  seen  in  Rus- 
sian thought  and  Christianity.  Tolstoi,  who  shares  the  Rus- 
sian Sympathism  with  Its  consciousness  of  suffering,  makes 
renunciation  fundamental  in  his  ideal  of  resignation,  by 
which  he  seeks  to  build  a  spiritual  life  around  the  center  of 
love  to  God  and  an  active  sympathy  for  humanity  but  upon 
the  ruins  of  self-love  and  self-seeking.  Dostoleffsky  uses 
renunciation  to  prepare  the  way  for  redemption  In  the  Chris- 
tian sense.  The  Idea  of  regeneration  is  paramount  In  Rus- 
sian thinking.  The  sense-world  does  not  offer  either  home 
or  work  sufficient  for  such  a  being  as  man  for  he  never  gets 
so  low  In  the  meshes  of  the  world  that  he  Is  hopeless.  Even 
Gorky,  who  Is  very  doubtful  of  man's  work  In  the  world, 
believes  that  even  for  his  most  miserable  characters  there  is 
hope  through  regeneration.  Here  is  a  pessimism  with  a 
positive  hope. 

Christianity  has  the  distinguishing  marks  of  the  '^Con- 
temttis  mundi"  and  the  ''Amor  Christi**  but  the  contempt  of 
the  world  is  not  Christianity  without  the  ''Amor  Christi"  for 
without  the  latter  It  would  be  no  improvement  over  the 
"hopeless  pessimism  of  Schopenhauer.^  Its  recognition  of 
the  evil,  sin,  misery  and  death  In  the  world  is  as  thorough- 
going as  Buddhism.  However,  it  possesses  the  pessimism  of 
strength  In  that  Its  "Comtemttis  miindi"  Is  in  order  that  its 
"Amor  Christi"  may  prevail.  Furthermore  Christianity  in 
positing  a  spiritual  world-order,  as  the  true  home  and  work- 
field  for  humanity,  meets  the  demands  of  man's  spiritual  ego 
as  we  acknowledge  It.     "For  the  spiritual  life  within  us  al- 

I.     Paulsen,  System  of  Ethics,  bk.  I,  ch.  2. 


54  The  Ethical  Ideal  of  Renunciation 

ways  presents  itself  as  something  transcendent  and  is  not 
coincident  with  our  life."^  Again  Christianity  in  its  idea  of 
redemption,  considers  the  evil  in  the  world  not  as  a  mere 
appearance  like  the  Hindoos,  but  as  a  moral  guilt,  some- 
thing which  has  no  fundamental  relation  to  the  world  of 
nature  but  rather  the  warping  and  misuse  of  it.  Therefore, 
there  remains  the  hope  of  a  positive  life  in  the  midst  of  na- 
ture. This  view  of  the  world  wins  the  assent  of  Eucken 
who  believes  that  it  makes  it  impossible  to  affirm  or  negate 
the  world  but  rather  to  take  a  position  where  both  affirma- 
tion and  negation  are  present.^ 

It  is  such  a  view  of  renunciation  as  Christianity  takes 
which  best  satisfies  this  thesis.  The  universality  and  per- 
sistence of  the  ideal  finds  explanation  in  the  inherent  struggle 
between  the  sense  and  spirit  always  waged,  but  not  always 
understood,  in  humanity.  The  mixture  of  sense  and  spirit 
is  such  that  no  clear  lines  are  drawn  in  the  conflict  and  for 
this  reason  renunciation  has  not  always  been  wisely  or 
properly  used.  When,  however,  the  ego  has  realized  its  own 
spiritual  self-hood  and  world-hood  as  posited  by  religion 
and  especially  by  Christianity,  it  has  found  renunciation  an 
absolute  necessity  for  its  own  self-affirmation  and  true  activ- 
ity. The  metaphysical  basis  is  thus  secure  in  the  spiritual 
nature  of  the  world  and  humanity.  The  moral  grounds  for 
our  ideal  are  to  be  found  in  the  moral  guilt  of  the  world. 
This  relieves  us  of  the  more  inimical  character  of  our  ethical 
ideal  but  at  the  same  time  it  reminds  us  of  its  necessity  and 
validity.  Renunciation  refuses  to  be  dismissed  from  the  field 
of  the  human  problem.  There  is  nothing  left  but  to  regard  it 
in  its  real  character  and  proceed  to  renounce  all  that  stands 
in  the  way  of  the  spiritual  order  and  God,  and  thus  rest 
in  religion;  and  also  to  renounce  all  that  stands  in  the  way 
of  the  welfare  of  humanity  and  rest  in  ethics.  Such  a 
use  of  renunciation  leads  to  the  completeness  of  life  as  set 
before  us  in  Christianity  for  having  attained  by  the  renun- 


1.  Eucken,  Life's  Basis  and  Life's  Ideals,  pt.  Ill,  sec.  i. 

2.  lb.,  pg.  Z2,2. 


Critical  Estimate  of  Renunciation  55 

<:iatory  pathway  the  immediacy  of  the  spirit  and  the  world- 
hood  of  the  self,  man  has  found  his  home  and  his  work. 
For  this  home  he  surrenders  all  else  and  for  his  work  he 
gives  himself,  for  as  Goethe  saw,  it  is  cosmic  toil.  Such  a 
view  of  renunciation  justifies  its  place  in  human  thinking  and 
only  by  its  employment  can  man  achieve  self-hood  in  a  world 
of  sense  and  enter  into  that  spiritual  World-order  where 
the  ego  is  at  home  and  where  its  work-field  lies. 


56  The  Ethical  Ideal  of  Renunciation 


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